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CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY, CONSTITUTIONAL CULTURE

Andrew M. Siegel'
ABSTRACT
Constitutionaltheorists and other constitutional commentators make heavy use of a paradigm that
mistakes certain aspects of our current constitutionaldecisionmaking processfor inherent parts of
our constitutional structure and ignores other important aspects of that process entirely. These
distortions and elisions raise concerns about the accuracy of much descriptive constitutional
commentary and the foundations of more normative and evaluative work. Drawing in part on an
emerging literature, this Article proposes a new paradigmfor thinking about the process through
which we make constitutional law, one that understands that almost all of our institutional
arrangements, practices, norms, and habits of thought are nominal, historically contingent, and
ever-evolving, and that aims to treat them as a complicated, interlocking "constitutionalculture."
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INTRODUCTION

This Article begins with the simple premise that constitutional law
does not emerge fully formed from the constitutional text. Nor, despite what many constitutional theorists suggest, does it result from a
semi-objective, decontextualized process of "constitutional interpretation."' To the contrary, constitutional law is made through a process
I

When constitutional scholars and judges talk about the process of making constitutional
law, particularly when they talk to non-professional audiences, they default to a language
that conceptualizes the judge's role as primarily or exclusively one of "interpreting" texts.
See, e.g., ANTONIN ScALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAw
(1997) (framing debate about constitutional interpretation as a struggle between interpretive methods); Owen M. Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretatiom, 34 STAN. L. REv. 739, 739
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in which claims about the concrete consequences of the text's openended commands are filtered through an ever-shifting set of institutional arrangements, historically contingent practices, and habits of
thought.
Its simplicity notwithstanding, it is a point worth emphasizing.
Despite the forests of trees that have been felled in the name of constitutional theory," legal academics have done a poorjob acknowledging, let alone analyzing, many of the specific practices, arrangements,
and habits of thought that shape the content of constitutional law in
early twenty-first-century America. To be more specific, mainstream
constitutional theory treats these core features of contemporary constitutional decisionmaking in two inconsistent and equally unconvincing ways.
On the one hand, constitutional theorists often identify certain of
our constitutional practices-such as the distinct educational and
professional experiences of federal judges, the existence of multimember appellate courts who must agree on the text of opinions,
(1982) ("Adjudication is interpretation: Adjudication is the process by which a judge
comes to understand and express the meaning of an authoritative legal text . . . ."); see also MICHAELJ. GERHARDT ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY: ARGUMENTS & PERSPECTIVES

vii (3d ed. 2007) (referring to the process of making and debating constitutional law as
involving the proper "interpretation" of the Constitution in each of first four sentences to
preface of otherwise sophisticated textbook on constitutional theory).
2

I am far from the first to make the observation that constitutional law is produced, at least
in part, through extra-textual institutions and norms that have developed over time. This
approach is a staple of political science literature about the Supreme Court. It is also at
the heart of the work of several of the most significant modern constitutional thinkers.
See, e.g., JACK M. BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION: POLITICAL FAITH IN AN UNJUST

WORLD 1 (2011) (examining how public attitude toward constitutional initiatives affects
their legitimacy); RICHARD H. FALLON JR., THE DYNAMIC CONSTITUTION:
AN
INTRODUCTION TO AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE 1-2 (2d ed. 2013)

3

(discussing constitutional law as a "practice" to signal the many external factors from
which constitutional law emerges); SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH 10 (1988)
(examining the complex relationship between the Constitution and the American political self-concept); H. JEFFERSON POWELL, A COMMUNITY BUILT ON WORDS:
THE
CONSTITUTION IN HISTORY AND POLITICS 7 (2002) (exploring the evolving interpretation
of the Constitution from a historical perspective); Robert C. Post, The Supreme Court 2002
Term-Foreword: Fashioning the Legal Constitution: Culture, Courts, and Law, 117 HARV. L.
REV. 4, 8 (2003) (examining three major cases from the 2002 Supreme Court term to explore how the values of non-judicial actors affect constitutional law); Reva B. Siegel, ConstitutionalCulture, Social Movement Conflict and ConstitutionalChange: The Case of the De Facto
ERA, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1323, 1323-25 (2006) (framing constitutional culture as the product
of interactions between citizens and officials that concern constitutional meaning). I
draw on some aspects of these works and criticize others in Part IV.
Many theorists have documented or lamented the extraordinary proliferation of constitutional theory in the last few decades, most succinctly Rebecca Brown. See Rebecca L.
Brown, Accountability, Liberty, and the Constitution, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 531, 531 (1998)
("Honk if you are tired of constitutional theory.").
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and the professional norms that limit the realm of legitimate constitutional arguments-as part of an underlying constitutional "structure." 4 Treating these constitutional practices as aspects of an underlying constitutional "structure" has two related consequences. First, it
makes them appear to be permanent, timeless, inherent features of
American constitutionalism. Second, it allows scholars to mobilize
them in response to common concerns about the open-ended and
arguably undemocratic
nature of American
constitutional
decisionmaking.
On the other hand, most constitutional theory largely ignores another set of newer and less glamorous institutional arrangements and
practices that share the field with those that comprise this reified
constitutional "structure." These practices-for example, the proliferation of amicus briefs, the increased use of law clerks, and the fact
that the public usually encounters Supreme Court opinions mediated
through other sources-do not escape public or journalistic notice,
but they are largely absent from the work of constitutional theorists,
including many whose theoretical models are highly dependent on
the accuracy of their descriptions of our constitutional practice.
This Article argues that the disparate treatment of these two sets
of constitutional practices is unjustifiable. The practices and arrangements that constitutional theorists reify as our constitutional
structure and treat as if they are part of our constitutional design are,
on closer inspection, nominal, historically-contingent, and everchanging.' At the same time, the newer, less glamorous practices and
arrangements that constitutional theorists ignore or relegate to footnotes are demonstrably important in shaping the content of contemporary constitutional law.
In the coming pages, I argue for an alternative approach that
treats these two sets of constitutional practices consistently and theorizes about them collectively under the name "constitutional culture."
Analytically, my approach posits that our alleged constitutional struc-

4

See infra notes 18-23; see also Helen Hershkoff, State Courts and the "Passive Virtues": Re-

thinking theJudicialFunction, 114 HARV. L. REv. 1833, 1914 & n.424 (2001) (describing the
process of setting roles for state court judges interchangeably as one of "institutional design" and of creating "constitutional structure," and citing to works in a variety of other
contexts that use "constitutional structure" in similar ways); Jonathan T. Molot, Reexaming
Marbury in the Administrative State: A Structural and InstitutionalDefense of Judicial Power

Over Statutory Interpretation, 96 Nw. U. L. REv. 1239, 1246-48 (2002) (defending a robust

5
6

vision ofjudicial power over statutory interpretation on the grounds that many norms of
contemporary judicial practice are part of our "constitutional structure").
See infra Part I (developing this point in detail).
See infra Part II (developing this point in detail).
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ture and the newer and messier practices ignored by our leading constitutional theorists are but different aspects of the rich body of complicated and historically-contingent practices, institutional arrangements, and habits of thought that define the contemporary American
way of constitutional decisionmaking. While other appellations
might suffice, and, in fact, are tempting given the frequency with
which scholars use the phrase "constitutional culture" for other purposes, identifying these practices, arrangements, and habits of
thought as a species of culture has the advantage of emphasizing
their most intriguing and analytically significant characteristics-such
as the way in which they are ever-changing yet deeply rooted in history and the fact that they are responsive to rational argument and intentional modification but also reflect deep commitments, guttural
instincts, and inchoate understandings.
The approach that this Article offers is original in its scope, terminology, and self-consciousness, but it is also grounded in an emerging strand of constitutional law scholarship that emphasizes the importance of cultural context for understanding the process through
which particular issues gain salience,8 the myriad ways in which both
legal and non-legal actors have mobilized to affect the course of constitutional history,' and the degree to which crucial decisions about
the structure of our constitutional decisionmaking process have been
(and must be) made with little recourse to the constitutional text.'o
One of the principal aims of this article is to draw attention to this literature, to explore the common assumptions at its core, and to sug-

7
8

9

10

See infra notes 156-159 and accompanying text (cataloging these uses).
See, e.g., Paul Horwitz, The Hobby Lobby Moment, 128 HARv. L. REv. 154, 158--60 (2014)
(exploring the social and cultural factors that increased the salience of the controversy
surrounding Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.); Michael J. Klarman, Windsor and Brown:
MarriageEquality and Racial Equality, 127 HARV. L. REv. 127, 128-29 (2013) (discussing the
changes in political and social context that made the Supreme Court decisions in Brown
and Windsorpossible).
See, e.g., Post, supra note 2, at 8 (emphasizing, in an analysis of major cases from the 2002
Supreme Court term, the role of non-judicial actors in shaping constitutional law); Siegel,
supra note 2, 1323-25 (discussing how constitutional dialogue between citizens and officials protects the democratic legitimacy of the Constitution throughout history).
See generally POWELL, supra note 2 (focusing on the impact that historical context has on
the shaping of constitutional doctrine); see also Akhil Reed Amar, The Supreme Court 1999
Term-Foreword: The Document and the Doctrine, 114 HARV. L. REV. 26, 26-28 (2000) (argu-

ing that constitutional case law often departs too far from the vision articulated in the
text of the Constitution); Ernest A. Young, The Constitution Outside the Constitution, 117
YALE L.J. 408, 413 (2007) (characterizing much of constitutional law as "deriv[ing] from
legal materials outside the Constitution itself").
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gest that we might be seeing the emergence of a newer, more realistic
paradigm in American constitutional theory."
In Parts I and II of this Article, I explain and develop my claim
that the standard works of modern American constitutional theory
deal with the strands of our constitutional culture in an unconvincing
and inconsistent way. Part I explores the crucial role that claims
about constitutional structure play in the standard explanation and
defense of American constitutionalism, and argues that that account
is ultimately built on a shaky and ahistorical foundation. Part II then
examines some more recent-and more controversial-aspects of
our constitutional culture, detailing their development, their importance, the degree to which they have drawn the attention of other
audiences, and their limited absorption into constitutional theory.
In the remainder of the Article, I develop an alternative approach.
Part III explains the concept of "constitutional culture," defending
both my substantive depiction of constitutional decisionmaking and
my choice of nomenclature." Part IV then begins the work of charting a new paradigm, discussing and analyzing an emerging body of
literature that-in some way or other-resonates with the core insights of this article and then laying out an agenda for further study.
Finally, Part V shifts from the descriptive to the normative, offering
both preliminary observations and questions for study about the implications of the constitutional theory framework for the health of
our system of governance.
Some aspects of this Article-and many of its implications-are
controversial. At the heart of the project, however, is an aspiration
that all well-meaning scholars and observers presumably share: to
understand the world we live in as it is rather than as we hope or fear
it to be. As this article will hopefully demonstrate, our ability to the-

11
12

13

See infra Part IV (developing this point in detail).
In defending my nomenclature, the focus below is on the noun ("culture"). As my colleague Charlotte Garden has helpfully reminded me, the adjective ("constitutional") also
requires a few words of explanation. This Article's use of the term "constitutional" is intended both to highlight the central analytic questions it engages (how do we really make
constitutional law?) and to locate it within a particular academic community (constitutional theory). That having been said, many of the Article's insights are derived from observations about appellate courts that apply with equal force to statutory and regulatory
cases.
To talk about starting our analysis from a more realistic place that takes the world "as it
is" is not to suggest that we can access the world "as it is" in an objective and unmediated
way or to assume that all observers will describe our constitutional culture in identical or
even similar terms. Rather, it merely posits the merits of an approach that attempts to
catalog more fully our constitutional institutions, practices, and norms; that appreciates
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orize about the big questions of constitutional governance-say, the
role of the courts, the influence of ordinary citizens, or the relationship between generations-is enhanced by understanding that the
path from constitutional text to constitutional consequence passes
through constitutional culture.
I. CONSTITUTIONAL "STRUCTURE"

Many contemporary constitutional theorists-particularly left-ofcenter theorists intent on defending a robust vision of the judicial
role-place heavy reliance on certain of our more well-ingrained
constitutional practices, conceptualizing them as part of our constitutional design." In this Part, I sketch out the story that those theorists
tell in greater detail and then offer a descriptive critique of their account.
A. The Story
If you have attended law school or read constitutional theory in
the last few decades, there is a story with which you are almost certainly familiar. It begins with a sort of confession. "Look," says the
professor or theorist, "I am a big fan of the work the Supreme Court
has done over the last sixty years expanding freedom and moving us
closer to a genuinely equal society, but, if I have to be honest, the
counter-majoritarian difficulty"' has always really nagged at me. At
first blush, it just doesn't seem right that the work of advancing freedom and equality should depend on the whims of nine unelected
geriatrics." After a brief pause for emphasis or a turning of the page,
he or she continues, "Lucky for me-and for you-however, I think
that way of looking at the problem is too simple. Let me tell you
why."

14

15
16

their historical trajectories; and that clearheadedly assesses their implications for our constitutional decisionmaking process.
See, e.g., LAWRENCE G. SAGER, JUSTICE IN PLAINCLOTHES: A THEORY OF AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL PRACTICE 5-10 (2004) (describing our inherent constitutional structure
as a collaboration between branches of government wherein the judiciary engages in areas of constitutional underenforcement surrounding issues that popular political institutions are better equipped to solve).
This Part only treats the normative implications of this critique in passing. I return to
that subject more directly in the Parts that follow.
See ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE
BAR OF POLITICS 16-17 (1962) (offering a classic account of the problem); see also Barry
Friedman, The Counter-MajoritarianProblem and the Pathology of ConstitutionalScholarship, 95
Nw. U. L. REV. 933, 933 (2001) (cataloging the ubiquity of the issue in constitutional theory).
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What follows goes something like this (though there are many variations on a theme): our nation isn't a democracy; it is a constitutional republic committed to the coexistence of democratic
decisionmaking and individual rights. Achieving the proper balance
between those equally important imperatives is a delicate question of
institutional design. No one organ of government or type of official
can be trusted to preserve both values; instead we need to design a
variety of institutions and staff them in such a way so as to ensure that
each reflects different perspectives and expertise. If properly designed, a robust judiciary is one of the institutions that helps achieve
the necessary balance. Whether a constitutional republic succeeds in
the long run depends on whether we have designed institutions that
on a day-to-day basis effectively mediate the tension between self-rule
and individual rights.
This claim is usually accompanied by a corollary argument from
efficacy, a self-congratulatory assertion that the United States has in
fact designed a constitutional structure that threads the needle.
Though different theorists stress different factors, again the commonalities outweigh the differences. Thus the argument progresses:
our judiciary is structurally independent from political influence.
Our judges share distinct educational and professional experiences
that differentiate them from other governmental actors and uniquely
qualify them to resolve certain types of questions. Most decisions of
consequence are made by multi-member courts whose members must
agree on their reasoning and spell it out in a publicly available opinion to which they sign their own names. Powerful professional norms
limit the realm of legitimate constitutional arguments, creating semiobjective standards that might be mobilized against attempted judicial usurpation. Due to our entrenched constitutional structure,
Americans can have their cake (democracy) and eat it too (individual
rights)."

These basic claims-that balancing the necessary requisites for a
constitutional republic presents a complicated problem of institutional design and that the success of the United States in dealing with
this problem stems from the existence of a set of well-ingrained constitutional practices that ought to be conceptualized as part of our
inherent constitutional structure-are at the heart of the traditional
liberal defense of the assertive style of judicial review that has charac-

17

Astually, given how much constitutional scholars like to argue even with those who share
their basic assumptions, theorists who adopt this narrative would probably vociferously
debate which attribute is the cake and which is the eating.
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terized American jurisprudence since the mid-1950s. The claims are
made most expressly in the canonical works of Lawrence Sager, 8 but
resonate through the scholarship of Cass Sunstein,' 9 Ronald
Dworkin,20 Chris Eisgruber, Jim Fleming,2 Richard Fallon," and
many others.
B. The Fluidity of "ConstitutionalStructure"

This common story is comforting and has the virtue of drawing attention to constitutional practices that tend to enhance the stability
of our constitutional order. It also suffers from a serious descriptive
flaw: by reading contemporary constitutional practices as part of our
inherent constitutional structure rather than as contingent and contested arrangements, it oversells their permanence and ignores the
hard work of countless individuals that has gone into-and continues
to go into-establishing and maintaining workable constitutional
norms.
As a secondary matter, this focus on constitutional structure also
distorts our understanding of the substance of contemporary constitutional arrangements and practices, at least around the margins.
Thinking and talking in terms of permanent structures requires theorists to abstract their depictions of constitutional practice, describing
them in terms that are generally accurate across multiple eras, rather
than in more precise ways that might more accurately capture our
current process of constitutional decisionmaking. As will be discussed in Part II below, theorists have a particular tendency to ignore

18

See, e.g., SAGER, supra note 14, at 5-10 (conceptualizing the judicial practice of constitutional underenforcement as a component of our inherent constitutional structure).

19

See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DESIGNING DEMOCRACY:

20

21

WHAT CONSTITUTIONS Do 239-43

(2001) (characterizing the role of "democracy's constitution" as facilitating constitutional
dialogue among diverse actors and allowing institutions to forge consensus where necessary).
See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, LAW's EMPIRE 355-57, 365-67 (1986) (discussing how the
constitutional practice of the United States has fostered stability); see also id. at 356 ("The
United States is a more just society than it would have been had its consitutional rights
been left to the conscience of majoritarian institutions.").
See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER, CONSTITUTIONAL SELF-GOVERNMENT 2-3, 10-11
(2001) (arguing that the abstract provisions of the Constitution and judicial review
should be construed to foster popular constitutional dialogue).

22

See,

23

AUTONOMY 3-5 (2006) (describing the "bedrock structures of our constitutional scheme"
as "deliberative political and personal self-government").
See, e.g., RICHARD H. FALLONJR., IMPLEMENTING THE CONSTITUTION 1-2 (2001) (describing American judicial supremacy as developing out of the United States' evolving constitutional culture).

e.g., JAMES E. FLEMING, SECURING

CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY:

THE CASE OF
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recent developments that alter or complicate traditional methods of
constitutional decisionmaking, treating them as aberrational, particularly if they undercut the triumphalist aspect of the comfort narrative
described in this Part.
One need only examine the historical record with regard to a
handful of the most salient aspects of our so-called constitutional
"structure" to understand that even the most familiar of our arrangements and practices are nominal, historically contingent, and
still evolving. The remainder of this Part takes on that task.
1. The Distinctive Background and TrainingofJudges

One claim that is often made by those who believe that the United
States possesses a constitutional structure primed for success is that
we have properly allocated significant decisionmaking (over an appropriate set of issues) to judges, who by their training and experiences are well-suited to resolve those questions.24 Leaving aside the
question of whether judges are in fact well-suited to resolving the
kinds of issues they currently adjudicate, 5 there is a kernel of truth to
the claim that federal judges share a common background and a
common set of experiences. Certainly, all current federal judges are
lawyers at least in name, all appear to be law school graduates, and
many have followed similar career paths that have shaped among
them a collective understanding of the role of the bench and bar that
transcends partisan and jurisprudential differences.
Still, the notion that the framers gave the courts a special role because they had a particular vision of the people who would staff the
bench belies the historical record. In different periods in American
history, Presidents have appointed-and the Senate has readily confirmed-judges and Justices with very different educational back-

24

25

26

For one of the fullest accounts of these arguments, see Paul E. McGreal, Ambition's Playground, 68 FORDHAM L. REv. 1107, 1171-85 (2000) (arguing that in the American constitutional scheme of balanced powers, the judiciary has a comparative advantage in interpreting the law because of the unique background and training of federal judges).
Cf. RICHARD A. POSNER, REFLECTIONS ON JUDGING 3, 5, 8-9 (2013) (encapsulating author's standing critique of the methods utilized by contemporaryjudges in resolving cases
and questioning the ability of these methods to answer many of the questions they pose);
ERIC J. SEGALL, SUPREME MYTHS: WHY THE SUPREME COURT IS NOT A COURT AND ITS
JUSTICES ARE NOTJUDGES 5-6 (2012) (arguing that most of what the Supreme Court does
in constitutional cases does not rely on any special expertise).
Cf L.A. Powe, Jr., The Not-So-Brave New ConstitutionalOrder, 117 HARv. L. REV. 647, 672-75
(2003) (reviewing MARK TUSHNET, THE NEW CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER (2003)) (discussing
the sense of collective purpose and superficial camaraderie that the contemporary Supreme CourtJustices feel based on their collective professional identity).
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grounds, life paths, and skill sets. To the extent that particular eras
have established norms as to the proper qualifications for the bench,
those norms have been transitory and-even in their heyday-only
partially actualized.
Take for example, the Justices of the Supreme Court. One recent
study reveals that the 112 Justices who have served on the Court have
been drawn from a wide variety of public and private sector positions." In possible tension with the notion that the courts are supposed to embody different virtues and experiences than the other
branches, the Justices throughout history have been almost as likely
to have had prior experience in the legislative branch as to have had
prior judicial service. 9 They have graduated from well-regarded law
schools, from less impressive ones, and from no law school at all
(even in the decades after formal legal education became the default
path to the bar)." Some have had effectively no practice experience

while others have ranked among the leading lawyers in the nation for
many years before their nomination.
In recent decades, we have adopted an almost comically narrow
path to the Supreme Court, in which a future Justice needs to attend
one of a handful of super-elite schools, rank near the top of his or
her class, clerk for a fancy judge or Justice, affiliate him- or herself
with one or the other of the major political parties, collect a reasonable but not excessive amount of experience in academia, government
service, or if necessary private practice, and serve however briefly on a
federal court of appeals.12 These norms, however, are almost entirely
27
28

For biographical data on the Justices, see generally LEE EPSTEIN ET AL., THE SUPREME
COURT COMPENDIUM (5th ed. 2012).
See, e.g., Lee Epstein et al., Circuit Effects: How the Norm of Federaljudicial Experience Biases

the Supreme Court, 157 U. PA. L. REv. 833, 835-36 (2009) (describing President Eisenhow-

29

30
31

er's goal of establishing the norm of prior federal judicial service and explaining how it
was not fully realized during his Presidency or even during the following five decades).
See RICHARD SEAMON ET AL., THE SUPREME COURT SOURCEBOOK 21, 22-23 (2013) (discussing the personal and professional backgrounds of Supreme Court Justices throughout history).
See id. (noting that less than two-thirds of Supreme CourtJustices had priorjudicial experience while about half had prior legislative experience).
The lastJustice to lack formal legal education, Stanley Reed, did not leave the bench until

1957. Id. at 23.
32

Slight deviations from this path are permissible-for example, Justice Sonia Sotomayor's
lack of a clerkship, Justice Elena Kagan's lack of prior judicial service, and Justice Clarence Thomas's failure to distinguish himself academically-but only if the nominee both
hits most of the benchmarks and brings to the table other characteristics that cannot be
found elsewhere in the candidate pool. As the story of Harriet Miers demonstrates, candidates (or nominees) whose profiles deviate significantly from these norms have a hard
time gaining traction in the process, even if they possess other strong indicators of professional success and legal acumen.
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the product of the last forty or fifty years. As other scholars have
pointed out,33 President Dwight Eisenhower was the first President
even to articulate a preference for judges with prior experience as a
federal appeals court judge. His immediate predecessors, and even
his first several successors, gave that qualification short shrift, developing alternative profiles or picking eclectically from different pools
of candidates.34 Many of the most important Justices of the twentieth
century came to the Court from the political arena, including Senator Hugo Black and Governor Earl Warren. While Justices were more
often than not intellectually and professionally distinguished, their
credentials were not nearly as elite or as uniform as those of the current Justices; to pick one easy target, Chief Justice Warren Burger was
a graduate of the night program at the St. Paul College of Law (now
the Hamline Mitchell School of Law).
To the extent that we now assume that Supreme Court nominees
will be seasoned Court of Appeals judges and academic Olympians,
those are new-and not necessarily stable-norms. Commentators
and politicians have frequently critiqued the uniformity of experiences and qualifications possessed by the current Justices," and President Bill Clinton made several attempts to identify and nominate a
candidate with more substantial political experience.3 ' Further, while
Justice Kagan in many ways fits the profile of the other current Justices, it is notable that her appointment put a non-judge back on the
bench, just five years after Justice Sandra Day O'Connor's retirement
and replacement by Justice Samuel Alito seemingly cemented the

33

34
35

36

See DAVID ALISTAIR YALOF, PURSUIT OF JUSTICES: PRESIDENTIAL POLITICS AND THE
SELECTION OF SUPREME COURT NOMINEES 44 (2001) (describing President Eisenhower's
preference for nominees "from the ranks of the federal courts of appeals and state supreme courts"); Epstein et al., supra note 28, at 835 (explaining how President Dwight D.
Eisenhower made it clear that he "would use an appeals court appointment as a stepping
stone to the Supreme Court").
See SEAMON ET AL., supra note 29, at 24, 26-27 (discussing the nomination processes and
selections of Presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon).
See Warren E. Burger:
1969-1986, THE SUPREME COURT HISTORICAL SOCIETY,
http://www.supremecourthistory.org/timeline-burger.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2016)
(explaining thatJustice Burger attended night classes for four years at that school "while
working in the accounting department of a life insurance company").
See, e.g., Mark Tushnet, Statement and Testimony, The Senate's Role in the Confirmation Process:
Whose Burden?: HearingsBefore the Senate Comm. on theJudiciary, Subcommittee on Administraive Oversight and the Courts, 107th Cong. 1st Sess. 179 (Sept. 4, 2001) (making case for appointment of some Supreme Court Justices with more political experience), reprinted in

50 Drake L. Rev. 511, 561 (2002).
37

For one account of President Clinton's flirtations with potential nominees from the political world (most notably Mario Cuomo, George Mitchell, and Bruce Babbitt), see JEFFREY
TooBIN, THE NINE: INSIDE THE SECRET WORLD OF THE SUPREME COURT 60-73 (2007).
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norm of prior federal appellate experience by creating the first Supreme Court completely staffed by former federal appellate judges.
To suggest that the Justices throughout history have shared a particular set of skills and experiences is to ignore too much data. There
is simply too much distance between Harry Truman's poker-playing
buddies and former Senate colleagues and today's hyper-credentialed
careerists, even leaving aside the eclectic cast of characters selected by
the vast majority of nineteenth-century Presidents. Even if the Justices had shared a more common pedigree or approach, there would be
little reason to think that those commonalities reflect an inherent
and intentional part of our constitutional design. To the contrary,
American history reflects sharp debates about the proper methods
for selecting judges and Justices and the characteristics that mark a
successful jurist and constant jockeying to forward and entrench particular views on these matters. 8
2. Multi-Member Courts,joint Opinions, and TransparentReasoning

Another claim made by those who laud our alleged constitutional
structure is that we have checked judicial excess by entrusting important appellate matters to multi-member courts whose members
must agree on their reasoning and then transparently lay it out for
the public over their own signatures." While it may well be that
norms of collegiality and transparency have salutary effects on the
tenor (or even the substance) of our constitutional discourse, constitutional theorists tend both to over-estimate the centrality of these
norms to our current constitutional practice and to treat them as inherent aspects of our constitutional design.
Once again, history belies their claims. To the contrary, opinion
drafting and circulating practices and relationships between the Justices have their own complicated history. To begin with the most obvious point, the claim that the Framers intended to limit the potential
38

For a succinct discussion of the sharp divisions of opinion on this issue during the
Jacksonian era, see LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 79-90 (3d ed.

2005).
39

See, e.g., Theodore W. Ruger, The ChiefJustice's Special Authority and the Norms of judicial
Power, 154 U. PA. L. REv. 1551, 1551 (2006) ("Judges are constrained, to a greater or lesser extent, by formal 'law,' but their discretion is additionally limited by the collective
structures of the federal judiciary and also by the normative expectation that judges give
express reasons for their decisions."); see also Frederick Schauer, Giving Reasons, 47 STAN.

L. REV. 633, 648, 654-56 (1995) (arguing that when judges give reasons for their decisions, this commits judges to stand by their holdings).

Cf Lewis A. Kornhauser & Law-

rence G. Sager, Unpacking the Court, 96 YALE L.J. 82, 100-02 (1986) (discussing implications of multi-member courts for our central debates about adjudication).

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

1080

[Vol. 18:4

for judicial abuse by requiring Justices to agree on the language and
reasoning of their rulings is seriously undercut by the fact that, until
several years into the Chief Justiceship of John Marshall, the Justices
did not sign a single opinion but instead spoke seriatim, in accordance with longstanding Anglo-American practice. 0 Moreover, most
scholars suggest that the shift from seriatim opinions to opinions for
the Court was designed to buttress the power of the judiciary, by allowing the Justices to speak with one clear voice, rather than to constrain that power.41
The decades since have seen a continuing evolution in the rules
and norms as to when a Justice might write and who he or she might
speak for. Internal Supreme Court rules and practices now create an
intricate set of protocols for determining who will have the first crack
at drafting the majority opinion and the primary dissent, if any, in
every case; when and how those drafts will circulate to the other Justices; when and how those Justices will respond to the drafts; and how
the Court will then proceed to resolve the case. Those rules and protocols are themselves the product of trial, error, and accreted tradition. Moreover, they are supplemented by a series of presumptions,
considerations, and habits of thought that shape the Justices' decisions on how to proceed when faced with decisions about whether to
request or require changes in the opinions of others, whether to write
separately to clarify their views, or whether to register dissent in cases
where they are heavily out-voted.42

40

See M. Todd Henderson, From Seriatim to Consensus and Back Again: A Theory of Dissent,

2007 Sup. CT. REv. 283, 292-303 (describing the British and early American practice of
delivering judgments seriatim). Similarly, the idea that the Justices are required to sign
their names to their opinions is at most an imperfectly realized norm, with federal appellate courts deciding many cases by unsigned (and often non-precedential) opinions; the
Supreme Court issuing unsigned per curiams in cases deemed too simple for oral argument approximately a half dozen times per term; and the Court resorting to per curiams
for opaque reasons in some particularly thorny cases, such as Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98

(2000).
41

42

See, e.g., Henderson, supra note 40, at 304-07 (describing the debate between John Marshall and ThomasJefferson over the switch away from seriatim opinions as a debate about
the scope ofjudicial power, with Jefferson arguing that seriatim opinions are a desirable
mechanism for limiting judicial overreaching).
On the historical evolution of opinion-writing protocols, see generallyJohn P. Kelsh, The
Opinion Delivery Practicesof the United States Supreme Court 1790-1945, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 137
(1999) (detailing the evolution of opinion-writing protocols, from unsettled practices in
1790-1801 through the Marshall period and to current ideas of individual judicial expression). On the decision whether to dissent, see generally Antonin Scalia, The Dissenting Opinion, 1994J. Sup. CT. HIST. 33 (discussing the advantages, disadvantages, and effects of writing dissenting opinions).
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The relationship between the Justices and the degree to which
they debate, discuss, and edit the content of opinions has similarly
varied over time. Memoirs and historical accounts suggest that the
Justices had relatively limited encounters with each other until the
Court's building opened in 1935 and perhaps for several years afterwards, as Justices worked at home, alone or in consultation with their
law clerk or secretary.
Once the Court moved into its own home,
the amount of day-to-day interaction increased somewhat, but the
Justices continued to do the bulk of their work alone in their offices.
Some pairs of Justices may have developed cordial personal relationships that involved frequent interaction, but many other pairs of Justices interacted almost exclusively at the Court's weekly conferences.
Those conferences themselves have evolved over time, from long
(and often unproductive) debates about how to resolve cases during
the 1950s to relatively short and orderly administrative proceedings
in which each Justice speaks once, summarizing his or her views on
each matter in two or three sentences." Based on a quick substantive
and strategic assessment of those position-statements, the Chief Justice or the senior Justice in the majority assigns the opinion to one
Justice. With that assignment comes the ability to shape the Court's
holding and rhetoric on dozens of axes left undiscussed at the Conference. In deciding how to shape the initial draft, the Justice works
in concert not with an ideologically diverse set of peers but instead
with his or her clerks, a team of junior lawyers hierarchically subordinate to the Justice and often chosen, at least in part, for their conformity with his or her ideological predilections.
It is hard to quantify the degree of deference each Justice gives to
the author of the majority opinion in shaping the holding. Certainly,
even a perfunctory review of the archival record reveals that the Justices routinely sign on to opinions without agreeing with the author
on all particulars. To some extent, such an arrangement is inevitable;
the Court would grind to a standstill if nine (or even five) diverse and
opinionated officials were required to agree on every phrase, prece43

44

See, e.g., THE SUPREME COURT IN CONFERENCE (1940-1985): THE PRIVATE DISCUSSIONS
BEHIND NEARLY 300 SUPREME COURT DECISIONs at 79 (Del Dickson ed., 2001) ("[I1n
1935 ...
[the Court] moved across the street into the new Supreme Court building....
Only George Sutherland and Owen Roberts took chambers in the new building. The rest
... continued to work at home.").
On the evolution of the conference, see WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, THE SUPREME COURT
254-58 (2d ed. 2001) (comparing the Justices' different styles when presiding over conferences, noting in particular the "taut atmosphere of the Hughes conference," the discussion-based atmosphere of the Stone conference, and the conferences of Warren Burger, which "were somewhere in between").
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dent, and argument. As I will describe in Part II below,4 5 I believe a
strong case can be made that the degree of deference to opinion authors at the Court has grown substantially, to the point that many
opinions might better be characterized as the product of a mini-law
firm acting with the acquiescence of other similar firms than as the
result of detailed deliberation among a multi-member court. One
need not accept that characterization, however, to grasp the thrust of
this Part, namely, that the relationship between the Justices and the
norms of opinion writing are not inherent parts of some underlying
constitutional structure but are instead dynamic, historically contingent, and ever-evolving.
3. ProfessionalNorms and the Limits of Legitimate Constitutional
Argument

Constitutional theorists and lawyers often mobilize the argument
that our constitutional structure constrains judges by holding them to
a set of professional norms that limit them to particular types of constitutional arguments and force them to craft their opinions in particular ways." This argument comes in a variety of forms, some softer
and some harder. In its harder form, the argument insists that the
realm of reachable constitutional conclusions is dramatically reduced
by rules and norms that require judges to produce a plausible case
for their position in a particular idiom while relying on a relatively
narrow set of considerations; in the language common to many appellate judges, sometimes an opinion 'just won't write." In its softer
forms, this argument from constitutional structure suggests that,
while judges might not literally be constrained from reaching any
particular constitutional conclusion by the existence of these interpretive norms, the norms serve either to consciously dissuade judges
from adopting particular positions in the face of a matrix of traditional legal sources pointing otherwise or to unconsciously cause

45
46

47

See infra notes 80-91 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Fiss, supra note 1, at 744-45 (discussing the degree to which, in all fields of interpretation, specifically including constitutional interpretation, "the freedom of the interpreter is not absolute [but instead] . . . is disciplined by a set of rules that specify the relevance and weight to be assigned to the material").
See, e.g., PatrickJ. Schiltz, The Citationof Unpublished Opinions in the Federal Courts of Appeals,

74 FORDHAM L. REv. 23, 49 (2005) ("Every judge has had the experience of finding that
an initial decision just 'won't write,' and thus every judge knows that it is manifestly untrue that reasoning and writing can be separated.")
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them to dismiss such positions as implausible during the early stages
481
of their deliberations.
When people talk about the limited set of constitutional arguments that judges can properly mobilize without subjecting themselves to scorn and ridicule, they usually have in mind a fairly stable
set of claims, relating primarily to text, history, precedent, and, at
least at the margins, consequences. In two influential works published in 1982 and 1991, Professor Philip Bobbitt provided the most
famous taxonomy of legitimate constitutional arguments, arguing
that there are six legitimate "modalities" of constitutional argument:
the historical, textual, structural, doctrinal, ethical, and pragmatic. 9
As he famously explained, "There is no constitutional legal argument
outside these modalities. Outside these forms, a proposition about
the U.S. Constitution can be a fact, or be elegant, or be amusing or
even poetic," but it is not a relevant constitutional argument.
Professor Bobbitt's analysis has been widely influential and his
taxonomy has become a ubiquitous fixture in the contemporary constitutional law classroom. While these modalities have proven an invaluable teaching tool, their prevalence and the natural inclination of
students to simplify what they learn have led to a belief that the line
between legitimate and illegitimate constitutional argument demarcated by Professor Bobbitt represents an inherent part of our constitutional structure or design. Such a conclusion is deeply problematic
for two reasons, one of which is central to Bobbitt's own analysis but
has largely been forgotten and the other of which poses something of
a challenge to his approach.
First, as Professor Bobbitt himself stresses, the particular claims
that resonate in our constitutional culture are the product of historical evolution, the result of rhetorical trial-and-error among the particular listening communities that have dominated American constitutional discourse.5 ' They succeed because they resonate and gain
their legitimacy from their potency. One can imagine other constitu-

48

49

50
51

See, e.g., Schauer, supra note 39, at 651-52 (talking about the complicated and limited but
still real ways in which requirements that judges give particular kinds of reasons for their
decisions "constrain" their future behavior).
PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 12-13 (1991) (listing these "six modalities of constitutional argument"); PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF
THE CONSTITUTION 5-8 (1982) [hereinafter BoBBrrr, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE].
BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION, supranote 49, at 22.
See BonBrT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE, supra note 49, at 6 (explaining that arguments that
are not part of our "legal grammar" may hold sway in other societies, and concluding that
"[t]his suggests that arguments are conventions [that] could be different, but that then
we would be different").

1084

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 18:4

tional systems in which other modes of argument are treated as legitimate or dispositive (and indeed such systems have and do exist) and
one can imagine paths that this nation might have taken that would
have created a different constitutional vocabulary. That these modalities hold sway currently is a description of the world we have created;
it is neither a normative statement that they are the "best" or "right"
kinds of argument nor an assertion that they are part of our inherent
constitutional structure.
Second, the boundaries between legitimate and illegitimate constitutional argument are not nearly as fixed as Professor Bobbitt suggests. What he offers is at best a snapshot of our constitutional culture at a particular moment in time; even then it is arguably an oversimplification. Our constitutional history is a tale of contestation
among competing interpretive visions, many of which have sharply
challenged the legitimacy of or argued for the primacy of particular
interpretive modalities.
Two recent examples-one macro and one micro-underscore
both the intentionality and the ongoing nature of this interpretive
contestation. Since the late 1970s or early 1980s, advocates of the
claim that originalist arguments (what Bobbitt would call "the historical modality") ought to trump all other modalities of constitutional
argument have been on the offensive.5 ' As scholars such as Jamal
Greene have demonstrated," the campaign for a hierarchical method
of constitutional interpretation that prioritizes originalist argument is
not something that simply happened, but is instead the result of a
conscious political project designed to reshape our judicial culture in
52

53

See James E. Ryan, Does it Take a Theory? Originalim, Active Liberty, and Minimalism, 58
STAN. L. REV. 1623, 1623-24 (2006) (reviewing STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY:
INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION (2005); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, RADICALS IN
ROBES: WHY EXTREME RIGHT-WING COURTS ARE WRONG FOR AMERICA (2005)) ("For the
last fifteen years or so,Justice Antonin Scalia and his sympathizers within and outside the
academy have dominated discussion and debate over how best to interpret the Constitution.").
SeeJamal Greene, Selling Originalism, 97 GEO. L.J. 657, 678 (2009) ("The originalist project begun in the 1970s aimed in large measure to restore power to prosecutors and state
legislatures."); see also STEVEN M. TELES, THE RISE OF THE CONSERVATIVE LEGAL
MOVEMENT: THE BATTLE FOR CONTROL OF THE LAW 2-3 (2008) ("While their particular
grievances differed, the conservative coalition was drawn together by . .. a unified call for
,strict constructionism' and 'judicial restraint.'"); Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Originalism
as a Political Practice: The Right's Living Constitution, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 545, 546-48
(2006) (explaining that originalism is a "powerful vehicle for conservative mobilization,"
which was active with critics of the Warren Court and bolstered by activists during the
Reagan Presidency). Cf Craig Green, An Intellectual History ofJudicial Activism, 58 EMORY
L.J. 1195 (2009) (describing the parallel process of selling the American public on norms
about the properjudicial role).
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particular ways. While this project has not completely succeeded, it
has certainly influenced the frequency with which the Justices resort
to different kinds of arguments, the weight they give them, and the
way in which their opinions are received by various communities outside the Court.
On a smaller scale, occasional shrill battles have broken out over
the last two decades over whether and when it is appropriate for
American courts to cite to the opinions of foreign courts.54 While
they get dressed up in all sorts of rhetoric, these debates are ultimately nothing more than particularly explicit skirmishes over whether
specific types of constitutional arguments-arguments from foreign
precedents-will enter into /remain in our constitutional vocabulary.
As foreign courts have gained prominence in areas in which American courts are used to being world leaders, such as individual rights,
and as globalization has shrunken the world and reduced the importance of international borders for many economic and cultural
pursuits, Americans have engaged with the question whether our
constitutional culture will treat the argument that "the plaintiff
should win the case because the European Court of Human Rights
decided a similar case that way" as a constitutionally relevant factor or
as a "poetic" non sequitor." Nothing in our Constitution or in our
history or in the writings of Phil Bobbitt requires a particular answer
to that question.
4. The StructuralPoliticalIndependence of Ourjudiciary

Those who speak in terms of constitutional structure often make
much of the degree of independence our courts have from the political process-stressing the wisdom of a system in which judges have
life tenure,- are appointed through a process designed to weed out
overt partisanship, and are protected by strong norms against jurisdiction-stripping, court-packing, and hair-trigger impeachment.56

54

55

56

See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi & Stephanie Dotson Zimdahl, The Supreme Court and Foreign
Sources of Law: Two Hundred Years of Practice and the juvenile Death Penalty Decision, 47 WM.
& MARY L. REv. 743, 838-83 (2005) (reviewing the history of such citations at the peak of
one such battle).
Cf BOBBi-r, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION, supra note 49, at 22 (noting that arguments that do not fit one of the six modalities may, among other virtues, be "poetic," but
that they are not constitutionally relevant).
See, e.g., William H. Rehnquist, The Future of the Federal Courts, 46 AM. U. L. REv. 263, 274
(1996) (describing "an independent judiciary" as "one of the crown jewels of our system
of government today"). For the most thorough treatment of the early evolution of these
ideas and their corresponding institutional arrangements, see Scorr DOUGLAS GERBER, A
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And there is, of course, some degree of truth to their description.
Indeed, it is uncontestable that the framers intended the judiciary to
have some degree of independence from the other branches and
wrote particular protections into the constitutional document itselfmost notabl life tenure and a prohibition on the diminution of judicial salaries' -to enhance the likelihood that the courts might maintain some such independence. 8 But, as recent scholarship has reminded us," the degree of that independence and the nature of the
influences the courts need protection from were not resolved by the
constitutional text but have instead been matters of fierce constitutional contestation.
As Dean Larry Kramer among others has explained,m a framing
generation versed in classical republicanism and emerging from a
conflict with an imperious crown was deeply concerned about the potential for corruption inherent in a system where the judges tasked
with evaluating and interpreting legislative and executive action are
dependent on the other branches for reappointment or remuneration. As deep as this concern ran, it was a bounded concern. While a
zealous protection of the personal and professional independence of
the judiciary is compatible with a broader independence from partisan politics, it in no way requires such an arrangement.
Perhaps the greatest virtue of Dean Kramer's controversial work
in this area is that it reminds us that a variety of different norms regarding the political independence of the judiciary are compatible
with our Constitution's text and drafting history. The particular set
of norms that currently prevail, some more entrenched than others,
include the aforementioned prohibitions on court-packing, jurisdiction-stripping, and partisan impeachment, as well as more general

DISTINCT JUDICIAL POWER:

57

(2011).
U.S. CONsT. art. III,

THE ORIGINS OF AN INDEPENDENT JUDICIARY,

1606-1787

§ 1.

59

On this point, the canonical cite is to THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton); see
generally GERBER, supra note 56.
The most provocative work along these lines is that of Larry Kramer (at times with John

60

Ferejohn).
See, e.g., LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES:
POPULAR
CONSTITUTIONALISM ANDJUDICIAL REVIEW 7-8 (2004); John A. Ferejohn & Larry D. Kramer, Independentjudges, DependentJudiciaiy: InstitutionalizingJudicialRestraint, 77 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 962, 1038 (2002); Larry D. Kramer, The Supreme Court 2000 Term-Foreword: We the
Court, 115 HARv. L. REv. 5, 6 (2001) [hereinafter Kramer, We the Court].
See supra note 59; see generally Stephen B. Burbank, The Architecture ofJudicial Independence,

58

72 S. CAL. L. REv. 315 (1999) (breaking down our understanding of "judicial independence" into component parts, historicizing each, and attempting to determine whether
there is a core understanding of judicial independence that is inherent in or generally
accepted within our constitutional culture).
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limitations on partisan political activity by current judges and on attempts by the executive to influence judicial decisionmaking on
While the adoption of those
pending or anticipated matters.
norms-and their imperfect actualization-have created a particular
constitutional culture that tells a particular story about the kind of
government we have and want to have, we might have chosen a different path and told a different story. For example, as Dean Kramer
suggests,"' we might have pursued, consistent with our constitutional
text, a series of norms that acknowledge the potent political power
embedded in our system of judicial review and conceptualized Con652
gress's many powers (to set the Supreme Court's terms, to structure
the lower federal courts,"" to adjust the courts' jurisdiction," to decide
on the size of the Court's membership," and even to impeach judges
and Justices") as explicit tools designed to counterbalance that power.
And, in fact, the process by which we have arrived at a relatively
broad understanding of the Court's structural independence from
politics has been far from smooth. During the first years of the Republic, political leaders-many of them leading figures deeply involved in the drafting and ratification of the Constitutionimpeached judges for partisan reasons," delayed a term of the Supreme Court for over a year to postpone the Court's consideration of
two politically charged cases," and dismantled our first appellate
court system (without providing compensation to the displaced judges) rather than let appointees of the prior administration serve. 9
Throughout the nineteenth century, Congress routinely adjusted the
size of the Court, often with an eye to maximizing the appointments
of friendly justices or minimizing the appointments of unfriendly

61

62

See generally Kramer, We the Court, supra note 59.
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. See also infra note 68 and accompanying text (discussing most

66

famous use of that power).
U.S CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 9; U.S. CONST. art. III,
U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 2.
U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 1.
U.S. CONsT. art. I, §3.
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See RICHARD E. EUIIs, THE JEFFERSONIAN CRISIS: COURTS AND POLITICS IN THE YOUNG

63
64
65

§ 1.

REPUBLIC 69-108 (1971) (detailing the successful impeachment ofJudge John Pickering

68
69

and the nearly successful impeachment ofJustice Samuel Chase).
Id. at 59-60. The delayed cases became, of course, Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803)
and Stuart v. Laird, 5 U.S. 299 (1803).
See ELLIS, supra note 67, at 36-52; see also Stuart, 5 U.S. at 301-02 (upholding repeal of
provisions of Judiciary Act of 1800 related to circuit courts, at least with regard to challenges brought by litigants).
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ones." Even to this day, legislators routinely submit bills seeking to
strip the federal courts ofjurisdiction over hot-button political issues
and scholars continue to debate the constitutionality of such bills." If
impeachment for employing dubious constitutional methodology
and expansion of the Court to add immediate representation for
newly formed super-majorities are currently off the table, they are so
only as the contingent result of a series of battles fought and decisions made over the last 200-plus years. 2 And there is no guarantee
that they will always remain so.
Attitudes as to the degree to which nominees and jurists ought to
be independent from-or in the alternative to represent-particular
ideological and political forces are also deeply, historically contingent
and hotly- contested. In different eras of our history, different Presidents have taken the prior political service and implicit ideological
convictions of potential judges into account to differing degrees, as
have Senators." Similarly, in different eras, important political and
interest groups have had differing expectations about the degree to
which judicial appointees might be expected to reflect their interests
and worldviews." Though my major point here is the malleability
and historical contingency of these practices, it is worth noting that
the current era is, measured against historical standards, marked by a
high degree of partisanship by all of these actors during the nomination and confirmation stage, particularly when it comes to lower
court judges. 5
II. NEWER, LESS GLAMOROUS CONSTITUTIONAL PRACTICES
Even a cursory study of contemporary American constitutional
decisionmaking shows that the reified constitutional "structure" discussed above shares the field with newer, less glamorous, and less frequently commented upon institutional arrangements and practices

70
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See F. Andrew Hessick & Samuel P. Jordan, Setting the Size of the Supreme Court, 41 ARIZ. ST.
L.J. 645, 647, 664-71 (2009) (discussing this history).
For a classic account of the ubiquity of such attempts, now thirty years old but still true in
all essentials, see Gerald Gunther, CongressionalPower to Curtail Federal Court jurisdiction:
An OpinionatedGuide to the OngoingDebate, 36 STAN. L. REV. 895, 896-97 (1984).
For one succinct summary of the story that emphasizes its contingency, see Barry Friedman, "Things Forgotten" in the Debate Overjudicial Independence, 14 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 737,
748-52 (1998).
See generally SFAMON ET AL., supra note 29, at 24-28 (discussing the "evolving process" of
selecting justices for the Supreme Court).
See id.
See infra notes 133-141 and accompanying text (developing this point and illustrating
some of its consequences).
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that are, nevertheless, often quite important in shaping the tenor of
our constitutional discourse and the substance of our constitutional
law. This Part will develop that claim by exploring several clusters of
contemporary constitutional practice that receive limited attention
from constitutional theorists, including (1) the role of law clerks, the
limited substantive interaction between the Justices, and the current
opinion-drafting model; (2) the rise of amicus briefs and the increasingly complicated use of them by litigants, interest groups, and others; (3) the fact that the public usually encounters Supreme Court
opinions mediated through other sources; and (4) the development
of an increasingly partisan nomination and confirmation process for
lower court judges and the proliferation of ideologically organized
spaces to develop ideas and campaign for reforms."'
Before I begin, however, a few caveats are in order. First, I make
no claim that these practices and institutional arrangements are, either individually or as a set, as important as the ones described in the
previous Part; nor, however, do I claim otherwise. I believe that it is
demonstrable that these aspects of our constitutional culture have serious consequences for the content of our constitutional law, but I
have neither a mechanism for nor a desire to measure the relative
importance of each piece of the cultural puzzle.
Second, I make no claim that the practices and arrangements described in this Part are firmly entrenched. As I argued above, the vast
majority of our constitutional practices and arrangements are nominal, historically contingent, and ever-evolving. Presumably, that is
true in spades for practices that are newer, less noticed, or less integrated into our prevailing constitutional narratives.
Finally, I do not mean to suggest that these practices have escaped
attention. To the contrary, journalists, bloggers, and popular commentators have written a great deal about each of these subjects, to
the point perhaps of exaggerating or over-sensationalizing some of
them.
Political scientists have also paid substantial attention to
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This list-like the list of practices discussed in Part I above-is illustrative, rather than
exhaustive. This Part might, just as easily, have discussed the press of the Supreme
Court's calendar, or the re-birth of a specialized, elite Supreme Court bar, or a half dozen
other aspects of contemporary constitutional decisionmaking.
See, e.g., EDWARD LAZARUS, CLOSED CHAMBERS: THE RISE, FALL, AND FUTURE OF THE
MODERN SUPREME COURT (1998) (offering another famed insider account of the Court,
this one by a former clerk, that emphasizes both the power of clerks and the partisan tensions allegedly dividing both the Justices and their clerks); BOB WOODWARD & SCOT
ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN: INSIDE THE SUPREME COURT (1979) (offering an account of
life inside the Supreme Court that accords substantial, perhaps exaggerated, power to
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many of them, writing about them independently and working them
into some of their broader models of judicial behavior.18 Finally, traditional legal scholars have written fine work about some of them,
particularly the rise of amicus briefs, though such work has usually
been descriptive or narrowly prescriptive without engaging the
broader constitutional theory literature."
A. The Role ofLaw Clerks and the Current Opinion-DraftingModel

Supreme Court Justices now work surrounded by at least four law
clerks, most of whom are recent or very recent graduates of elite law
schools selected from among many equally compelling candidates
through a process that emphasizes references and resume triggers.80
While every Justice maintains a different relationship with his or her
clerks, it is safe to say that all the Justices discuss with their clerks the
cert-worthiness of potential cases, the merits of granted cases, and the
substance of both their own opinions and those of the other Justices,
often at great frequency and in great detail. In every chambers, law
clerks participate in the drafting of opinions; by most reports, they
take the lead role in producing the first draft in the majority of
chambers." In most chambers, they offer the Justices direct advice
clerks); Adam Liptak, The Polarized Court, N.Y. TIMES, May 11, 2014, at SRI, SR6 (discuss78

ing increased politicization and ideological polarization in the federal courts).
See, e.g., PAUL M. COLLINS, JR., FRIENDS OF THE SUPREME COURT: INTEREST GROUPS AND
JUDICIAL DECISION MAKING (2008) (analyzing and explaining the influence of interest
group amicus curiae activity on Supreme Court decisionmaking); TODD C. PEPPERS,
COURTIERS OF THE MARBLE PALACE:

&

79

THE RISE AND INFLUENCE OF THE SUPREME COURT

LAw CLERK (2006).
See, e.g.,Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Influence ofAmicus CuriaeBriefi on the
Supreme Court, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 743, 749-50 (2000) (documenting the marked increase
in amicus curiae participation in Supreme Court cases and finding that amicus briefs influence the outcome of cases to the extent they import valuable new information); Kelly
J. Lynch, Best Friends? Supreme Court Law Clerks on Effective Amicus Curiae Briefs, 20 J.L.
POL. 33, 33-35, 72 (2004) (detailing the interview responses of former Supreme Court
clerks as to the usefulness and influence of amicus briefs); Linda Sandstrom Simard, An
Empirical Study of Amici Curiae in Federal Court: A Fine Balance of Access, Effciency, and

Adversarialism, 27 REv. LITIG. 669, 675, 710-11 (2008) (analyzing the role of amicus briefs
in modern federal litigation and concluding that the lack of procedural mechanisms lim-

iting amicus brief filings harm judicial efficiency).
80

For a list of the clerks for October Term 2014 and some of the early hires for October
Term 2015, annotated with some of the relevant rdsume triggers, see David Lat, Supreme
Court Clerk Hiring Watch: Looking Ahead to October Term 2015, ABOVE THE LAW (June 27,

2014, 10:08 AM), http://abovethelaw.com/2014/06/supreme-court-clerk-hiring-watch81

looking-ahead-to-october-term-2015/.
See ARTEMus WARD & DAVID L. WEIDEN, SORCERERS' APPRENTICES: 100 YEARS OF LAW
CLERKS AT THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 200-36 (2006) (describing the differing
opinion-writing processes in Supreme Court Justices' chambers and arguing that in re-

Apr. 2016]

CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY, CONSTITUTIONAL CULTURE

1091

on how to rule and what to say and, in some instances, they are allowed to, or even instructed to, debate the Justice when they disagree.
They also serve as an intellectual and cultural bridge to the Justices,
bringing new ideas or concerns into the chambers from the academy,
from the other courts on which they previously clerked, and from the
broader culture.
Though Justice Horace Gray hired the first legally trained assistant
at the Court in 1882,3 their proliferation has been relatively slow.
Congress first agreed to pay for clerks (one per Justice) in 1922 and
the number of clerks per Justice was only two for most of the twentieth century.84 It was only during the last quarter of that century that
Congress, in rapid succession, authorized a third, then a fourth clerk
for each Justice and a fifth for the Chief Justice . During the same
time that the Justices found themselves surrounded by a growing
number of young lawyers of their own choosing, they also-perhaps
coincidentally-found themselves in shorter conferences (and, by
some accounts, in fewer informal conversations) with their peers. 86
The overall effect of these changes is to re-center the Justices' intellectual life around their chambers. On a day-to-day basis, the Justices engage in most of their intellectual exchanges and do most of
their productive work as the vastly senior member of a small team of
lawyers rather than as part of a peer group. The other lawyers in the
group are dependent upon the Justice for their entree to power and
for the career enhancement it will provide and, in most cases, lack
significant legal and life experience, creating profound power dynamics in their intellectual exchanges. Moreover, clerks are more often than not selected through a process that emphasizes-or at least
values-intellectual and political congruity with the Justice whom
they serve, raising the possibility of an ideological echo chamber in
which some ideas are not sufficiently vetted.
When a Justice is assigned an opinion or choses to write separately
in a case, the dynamics of the chambers influence the shape and sub-

82
83
84
85

86
87

cent years, Justices have ceded greater responsibility to clerks in the actual drafting of
opinions).
For the most thorough academic treatments of the role of law clerks, see generally
PEPPERS, supranote 78; WARD & WEIDEN, supra note 81.
See PEPPERS, supra note 78, at 3.
See Martha Swann, Clerks of the justices, in THE OXFORD COMPANION TO THE SUPREME
COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 159, 159-60 (Kermit L. Hall et al. eds., 1992).
See id. For a fuller narration of these events, see generally PEPPERS, supra note 78.
See supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text.
See Adam Liptak, A Sign of Court's Polarization: Choice of Clerks, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 2010, at

Al, A16.
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stance of the opinion. Whether a Justice writes the first draft him or
herself or entrusts that task to a clerk, the process of drafting an opinion almost always involves the iterative exchange of drafts and the ritual give and take between author and editor that sometimes leads to
careful and polished prose but at other times leads to work that looks
as if it has been drafted by a committee." As Justices and their teams
ofjunior lawyers work collaboratively to finish work under tight deadlines, to persuade other Justices, and to answer criticisms levied by
other opinions, the opinion-producing process often comes to resemble a competition between small law firms seeking to impress and
outdo other similar firms, rather than a process of collaborative
decisionmuaking between nine ideologically diveise peers.
These dynamics are reinforced by factors about the current opinion-drafting culture of the Court that have little or nothing to do with
the prevalence of law clerks. As the Justices' conferences have shifted
from the elaborate debates and posturing speeches of yore to a forum
foi the efficient exchange of shoit position statements, the amount
left open after conference has increased.8 9 To a great extent this is by
design, as the Justices trust each other to resolve open questions in an
evenhanded way and believe that the opinion circulation process
serves as a check on over-reaching. By spending very little time in
consultation and farming the Court's work out to small law firms to
take the first cut at the complicated doctrinal and drafting issues
raised by each case, the Court hopes to operate more efficiently and
expeditiously.
The dynamics discussed in this subpart play out differently in different cases. Sometimes, though assuredly not as often as they think,
clerks make decisions about the language or the methodology of an
opinion or the scope of its claims that reflect nothing other than
their own preferences or their blind guess at the Conference's preferences. At other times, Justices disagree with their clerks about the
outcome of a case or communicate ineffectively with them, producing an opinion that is schizophrenic or incoherent.o Sometimes, Jus-

88
89
90

See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 25, at 238-55 (critiquing the practice of delegating the task of
writing first drafts to law clerks on both substantive and stylistic grounds).
See supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text.
To take one high profile example, ever since the Supreme Court handed down its deci-

sion in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), overruling Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186
(1986) and holding that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits
states from criminalizing private consensual sexual conduct between same-sex adults, persistent rumors have circulated that the lack of analytic clarity in the opinion results, in
part, from the fact thatJustice Kennedy was "writing against" the clerk with whom he was
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tices, egged on by ideologically sympathetic clerks or tempted by the
opportunity afforded by the Court's opinion-assigning model, push
their claims further than they might otherwise or strategically use
their assignments to stir "bread crumbs" or drop "time bombs" into
their opinions in order to set the stage for future cases. 9' At other
times, the lack of an opportunity to develop a pre-drafting consensus
on the details of a case's outcome results in a vague, under-theorized,
or ambiguous opinion.
What is important for the purposes of this Article is not the particular ways in which contemporary arrangements and practices relating to clerks, conferences, and opinion-writing shape the content of
the Court's opinions, but rather that they do. Or more specifically,
that they do and that constitutional theory largely fails to recognize
this fact. When constitutional theory talks about constitutional meaning, it often focuses on a decontextualized process of constitutional
interpretation and construction in which abstracted judges think abstractly about what the Constitution means and how to implement its
commands. When constitutional theorists do bring constitutional
practice into the conversation, their frame remains narrow, looking
at big picture features of our constitutional order that might be treated as part of the underlying constitutional design. Rarely, however,
do they stoop down to see just how much of the content of constitutional opinions is shaped by the messy day-to-day reality of power dynamics, time pressure, and incentives created by the Court's current
staffing and opinion-assigning protocols.
B. The Role ofAmicus Briefs

In recent decades, the number of amicus briefs filed in the Supreme Court has exploded as litigants and interest groups have become increasingly sophisticated about the possible uses and benefits
of such briefs." It is now common practice for litigants and their
counsel to strategize about the kinds of amicus briefs that might be
helpful to their side and to solicit or coordinate with other lawyers

91

92

working, who disagreed with the outcome. Cf TOOBIN, supra note 37, at 189 (noting that
three ofJustice Kennedy's four clerks that term were "conservatives").
See, e.g., Richard L. Hasen, Anticipatory Overrulings, Invitations, Time Bombs, and Inadvertence: How Supreme CourtJusticesMove the Law, 61 EMORY L.J. 779, 780-81 (2012) (describing various methods by which Supreme Court Justices and clerks lay the groundwork for
future changes in precedent without overtly changing the law in the instant case).
See Simard, supra note 79, at 677-79 (noting that the volume of amicus briefs at the Supreme Court increased by 800% between 1965 and 1999).
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and sympathetic interest groups to provide them.
In addition, a
growing number of interest groups, organizations, and corporations
independently monitor the Court's docket, seeking to identify cases
in which they might want to offer their perspective or note their preferences. 94
As other scholars have cataloged, amici are motivated by a diverse
set of goals.95 Some have particular information they want to bring
before the Court, in order to aid them in their decision or lead them
to a particular result.i Similarly, some have legal arguments that
have been or are likely to be ignored by the parties to which they
would like to draw the Court's attention. Others would like to steer
the Court away from or towards particular doctrinal formulations or
language out of concern for the implications those words might have
on later cases."
Some have less substantive goals. Perhaps the single most common reason for filing an amicus brief is to let the Court know how or
how strongly particular constituencies feel about a pending case, or,
as it is more colloquially put, to "weigh in" on the case."9 Groups and
individuals often see the filing of amicus briefs as an opportunity to
demonstrate their influence or their engagement to their members,
their peers, or the broader public. Amicus campaigns can serve as ad
hoc organizing drives, as fundraising drives for public interest groups
and trade organizations, and as an opportunity to cement alliances
and relationships between organizations or academics. 00
Empirical scholarship and anecdotal observation of the Court's
work both suggest that amicus briefs, in the aggregate, have a small
but discernable impact on the outcome of the Court's cases.'0 ' Be93

94

See Paul M. Smith, The Sometimes Troubled Relationship Between Court and Their "Frends,"24
LITIG. 24, 24-25 (1998) (discussing the growing prevalence of amicus briefs and the Supreme Court's efforts to guard against abuse).
See, e.g., SEAMON ET AL., supra note 29, at 380 n.3 (discussing recent efforts of the Cham-

99
100

ber of Commerce and other "conservative" groups to increase their amicus participation
in response to a perception that "liberal" groups have been more active in doing so).
For a good summary of the most common reasons why amici participate in litigation, see
Simard, supra note 79, at 680-84; see alo REAGAN WM. SIMPSON & MARY R. VASALY, THE
AMicus BRIEF: HOW TO BE A GOOD FRIEND OF THE COURT 24-25 (2d ed. 2004) (offering a
similar list of reasons).
See Simard, supra note 79, at 680-84.
See id.
See infra notes 107-108 and accompanying text (discussing one such case).
See SIMPSON & VASALY, supra note 95, at 21-22.
See Robert S. Chang, The Fred T Korematsu Center for Law and Equality and Its Vision for So-

101

of amicus campaigns).
See, e.g., Kearney & Merrill, supra note 79, at 749-50.

95

96
97
98

cial Change, 7 STAN.J. C.R. & C.L. 197, 200-01 (2011) (explaining the organizing potential
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yond that, however, the proliferation of amicus briefs changes the
dynamic of constitutional decisionmaking in crucial but underappreciated ways. To begin with, the rise of amicus briefs and the increasingly sophisticated use of them by parties and interest groups
fundamentally change the nature of the information before the Justices and their clerks. Historically, judges have operated in something of a bubble about the potential consequences and likely public
reaction to their decisions, a fact that has been considered at various
times both a virtue and a vice. Increasingly, however, modem Justices
have before them an impressive legislative record: detailing crucial
scientific, social scientific, historical, and economic background; offering assessments of the practical consequences of potential rulings;
announcing the official position of crucial constituencies on the
pending matter; and providing a window into how the public at large
might react to different potential rulings.0 2
At times, we can see clear evidence of the influence of this information. For example, in the important University of Michigan affirmative action cases decided in 2003,103 the Court expressly discussed and seemed heavily influenced by a series of amicus briefs by
military leaders, powerful corporate interests, and other members of
the elite emphasizing the practical importance of affirmative action
for the smooth functioning of contemporary American institutions
and the productivity of the American economy.'"4 Similarly, in Lawrence v. Texas,10 the Court borrowed heavily from an amicus brief filed
by a group of historians, adopting a narrative of the history of the
regulation of same-sex sexual activity that was in sharp contrast to the
account offered by the Court in Bowers v. Hardwick and using the alleged faultiness of Bowers' account as a reason to overrule that deci1007
sion.'" To take a slightly subtler example, in Troxel v. Granville, a

102

Recent scholarship has raised troubling questions about the accuracy of much of the information contained in amicus briefs. See Allison Orr Larsen, The Trouble with Amicus

Facts, 100 VA. L. REv. 1757, 1758, 1761 (2014). These developments only further underscore the need for honest and contextual exploration of the institutions and practices of
constitutional decisionmaking to ensure that constitutional theory is not built on a house
of sand.

103
104

Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
See, e.g., Consolidated Brief of Lt. Gen. Julius W. Becton, Jr. et al. as Amicus Curiae in

Support of Respondents at 5, Gruiter, 539 U.S. 306 (No. 02-241); Brief for 65 Leading
American Businesses as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, at 1-4, Gruter, 539 U.S.

105

306 (No. 02-241).
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567-68, 570, 574-75 (2003).

106

See Brief of Professors of History George Chauncey et al. as Amicus Curiae in Support of

107

Petitioners, at 2-4, 6-7, Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558 (No. 02-102).
530 U.S. 57 (2000).
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case involving the constitutionality of a grandparents' visitation statute, the Court issued an uncommonly unsatisfying split decision with
little predictive value, likely in part because the Justices were paralyzed by a set of concerned amicus briefs by advocacy groups (notably
including gay and lesbian rights organizations) warning about the potential unintended consequences of a broad holding in the case."'
These examples are important for what they say about the process
of contemporary constitutional decisionmaking. Justices and clerks
are pressed for time and genuinely concerned about getting the underlying facts right and designing workable and not wildly unpopular
solutions to the problems posed by their cases. They find prepackaged narratives and arguments sitting on their desks, clearly labeled to make their social and political stakes clear. Those briefs are
bound to influence them and to make their way into the Court's
opinions either directly (through a cut and paste or paraphrase) or
indirectly (through their influence on the thought processes of these
consumers). Even when clerks and Justices have determined the result in their cases and reached resolution of the crucial doctrinal issues without resort to amicus briefs, they have before them a wish list
of policy positions and specific concerns offered by various groups,
some of whom they have natural affinity towards. It is tempting-and
far from nefarious-to take into account those concerns by clarifying
a doctrinal formulation, reserving an issue, or inserting or deleting
an empirical point.
The abstract picture that constitutional theory draws of constitutional judging rarely-if ever-accounts for contemporary institutional practices and arrangements related to amicus briefing. The
failure to do so is a notable omission, as these practices and arrangements shade the very nature of the judicial endeavor, eroding the already over-stated line between judicial and legislative competencies
and virtues. Judges-or at least Supreme Court Justices-now have
before them a much fuller and more legislative-looking'" record than
they have had in previous generations. Their decisionmaking process
provides them with opportunities and incentives to utilize this record.
And their finished work product has come more to resemble legisla108

109

See id. at 59, 63, 73 (striking down a statute on narrow grounds in a plurality opinion accompanied by two separate opinions concurring in the judgment on different grounds
and three separate dissenting opinions); Brief of Lamda Legal Defense and Education
Fund and Gay and Lesbian Advocates and Defenders as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondent at 3-5, Troxel, 530 U.S. 57 (No. 99-138) (advocating extreme caution).
Whether a "record" compiled largely from amicus briefs is even as accurate as a legislative
record is an open question, particularly in light of the evidence uncovered by Allison Orr
Larsen. See Larsen, supra note 102, at 1759-61.
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tion, with different passages meeting the wishes of different constituencies and the opinions giving rise to identifiable winners and losers
beyond the litigants in the case. Normative discussions of the scope
of the judicial power or the nature of the judicial role that fail to take
into account these transformations in our underlying constitutional
practice are, of necessity, incomplete.
C. The Mediation of Supreme Court Opinions

Up until this point, this Part has focused on practices, institutional
arrangements, and norms that influence the content of Supreme
Court opinions. However, as discussed briefly aboveno and more fully
below,'" Supreme Court opinions are not in and of themselves constitutional law. They are no more and no less than a crucial intermediate stage in the process by which we get from the Constitution's written text to concrete consequences for individuals and for the broader
society. Practices, arrangements, norms, and habits of thought that
influence how we process and interpret court opinions and how we
implement or fail to implement their commands are every bit as essential to our constitutional culture as those that influence the opinion crafting process.
One feature of contemporary constitutional decisionmaking that
is rarely acknowledged and almost never analyzed is the fact that most
people do not experience Supreme Court opinions directly but instead encounter their content as mediated through other sources, be
it dueling press conferences on the steps of the Court, talking heads
on television, press releases issued by politicians and interest groups,
journalistic accounts, or blog posts." Members of the public form
their account of what each opinion says, what its implications are, and
how they should feel about it not by parsing the text, but by responding to summaries, analyses, and snippets organized and presented by
mediating sources.

110
Ill
112

See supra text accompanying notes 1-2.
See infra Part V.A.
The general public has likely never consumed Supreme Court opinions in an unmediated way. However, the dynamics of such mediation have changed in a world characterized
by partisan news channels, real time blog coverage, and news campaigns coordinated by
litigants. In recent high profile cases like King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2485 (2015)
(raising a statutory challenge that might have gutted a major health care law), the months
leading up to oral argument saw the extension of such methods into the pre-argument
phase, with press releases, blog posts, op-eds, and tweets shaping the case for public consumption.
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This phenomena might be dismissed as an interesting (or disturbing) side-show but for two things: the central role that perception of
an opinion plays in its enforcement, judicial implementation, and
legislative response, and the feed-back loop through which
knowledge of that fact in turn influences the shape and content of
Supreme Court writings. Beginning with the first point, it has long
been understood by sophisticated litigants and social movement attorneys that achieving constitutional change through litigation requires not only Supreme Court victories but also the creation of social conditions that encourage or compel lower court judges, elected
officials, and members of the general public to understand those decisions broadly, accept them as binding, and enforce them vigorously."" To that end, organizations and individuals keenly interested in
Supreme Court decisions have, for at least three-quarters of a century, worked to control public perception of the content, implications,
and wisdom of those decisions." 4 In recent years, such practices have
become more widespread, as the proliferation of social media, cable
television, and online information sources have expanded the opportunity to create narratives and offer targeted assessments of court
opinions. They have also become more institutionalized, as media
sources have come to expect dueling press conferences on the court
steps and prompt press releases from trade groups and advocacy organizations after oral arguments and the issuing of opinions in important cases.
Recent experience in high profile cases underscores this history.
In Grutter v. Bollinger,"' one of the two Michigan affirmative action
cases, dissenting Justices and opponents of affirmative action, abetted
by a sloppy set of initial press reports,"' created a public perception
thatJustice O'Connor's opinion contains an explicit sunset provision
making affirmative action unconstitutional in twenty-five years rather
than, as is more likely, a prediction that such preferences "will no

113

The most thorough literature on this point involves the civil rights movement and, in particular, the challenge to segregated schools and facilities in the South. See, e.g., MARK V.
TUSHNET, THE NAACP's LEGAL STRATEGY AGAINST SEGREGATED EDUCATION, 1925-1950,
at 175-76, 183 (2d ed. 2004). For a sophisticated recent take on these issues, see Lani
Guinier & Gerald Torres, Changingthe Wind: Notes Toward a Demosprudence ofLaw and So-

cial Movements, 123 YALE L.J. 2740, 2742-45 (2014).
114

See, e.g., TUSHNET, supra note 113, at 175-76, 183.

115

See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 346-49 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting); id. at 378-79
(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); id. at 387-88, 395 (Kennedy,J., dissenting).

116

On the spectrum of possible readings ofJustice O'Connor's arguments, see Joel K. Goldstein, justice O'Connor's Twenty-Five Year Expectation: The Legitimacy of Durational Limits in

Grutter, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 83, 85-86, 143 (2006).
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In Kelo v. City of New London"I
and Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.,"" opponents of the decilonger be necessary" at that time."

sions both inside and outside the Court created contestable narratives
about the Court's opinions that galvanized opposition and inspired
legislative reforms to ameliorate the impact of the decisions."o Perhaps most disturbingly, in the years after Lawrence v. Texas,"' opponents of the decision (and of gay rights more generally) took advantage of ambiguities in Justice Kennedy's majority opinion and his
failure to respond to Justice Scalia's characterization of the opinion
to convince lower courtjudges to read the decision in an exceedingly
narrow manner, ignoring many of the central ideas and language in
the opinion and stripping it of much precedential weight.'
As these examples illustrate, successful attempts to shape popular
narratives about Supreme Court decisions are often abetted or even
inspired by dissenting Justices who construct narratives, use imagery,
and offer loaded characterizations of majority opinions in order to
affect the public perception, implementation, and long-term viability
of the Court's rulings. Justices know full well how to turn up the
rhetoric or shift the imagery in order to draw popular and press attention and often do so to great effect.12 Nor are majority authors
immune from this desire to influence the reception of the Court's
decisions, making crucial narrative and rhetorical decisions or decid-
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119

120

Compare Grutter, 539 U.S. at 343 ("We take the Law School at its word that it would 'like
nothing better than to find a race-neutral admissions formula' and will terminate its raceconscious admissions program as soon as practicable. .. . We expect that 25 years from
now, the use of racial preferences will no longer be necessary to further the interest approved today." (citations omitted)), with id. at 364, 376 & n.13 (ThomasJ., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (describing Court's opinion as "holding" that affirmative action "will be unconstitutional in 25 years").
Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 472, 489 (2005) (holding that "the city's proposed disposition of [petitioners'] property qualifies as a 'public use' within the meaning
of the Takings Clause").
Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618, 621 (2007) (holding that the
after effects of past discrimination do not create new filing deadlines for EEOC claims
and that claims made after the deadline are untimely).
See Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5 (codified at 29
U.S.C. §§ 626, 633a, 794a, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5, e-16 (2014)); see also Ilya Somin, The Limits of Backlash: Assessing the Political Response to Kelo, 93 MINN. L. REv. 2100, 2101-02
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123

(2009) (describing the legislative response to Kelo).
539 U.S. at 558, 562-63.
SeeJoseph Landau, Misjudged: What Lawrence Hasn't Wrought, THE NEW REPUBLIC (Feb.
16, 2004), https://newrepublic.com/article/67372/misjudged (discussing early cases
reading Lawrence narrowly). Cf supra note 90 (discussing one possible explanation for
the confusing and contradictory language in the Lawrence opinion).
See Andrew Siegel, justice Stevens and the Seattle Schools Case: A Case Study on the Role of Righteous Anger in ConstitutionalDiscourse, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 927, 933-37 (2010).
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ing what sources to cite with eyes towards a broader audience. 2 4
Though Justices have always engaged in these tactics-witness Chief
Justice John Marshall's careful construction of the opinion in Marbury
v. Madison125 or Chief Justice Earl Warren's conscious decision to
streamline the opinion in Brown v. Board of Education 5"'-changesin

our contemporary constitutional culture have subtly shifted judges'
incentives and, perhaps, their practices. At least as an impressionistic
matter, the contemporary Court seems more aware of the fact that
the broader audience they are writing for is not, at least directly, the
general public, but instead a diverse set of opinion-makers (including
journalists, bloggers, advocates, and academics) who will in turn
translate their opinions for broader public consumption.
D. IncreasinglyPartisanLower Court Nomination Battles, the Growth of the
Internet, and Growing Strategic Sophistication

Perhaps no single episode better demonstrates the danger that
constitutional theory faces when it ignores evolutions in our constitutional decisionmaking culture than the failure of mainstream constitutional scholars to take seriously the argument that the individual
health care mandate contained in the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act 2 1 exceeded Congress's Article I powers.'2

In the first

weeks after the challenge was announced, it was difficult to find a
mainstream constitutional scholar who gave the claim even the remotest chance of succeeding; one law school famously announced
that they could not have a debate on the matter because they could
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See, e.g., RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLEJUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OFEoucATION
AND BLACK AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY 700-09 (1976) (describing the process by
which Chief Justice Warren put together a majority opinion in Brown v. Board of Education).

125
126
127

5 U.S. 137 (1803).
347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
Pub. L. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010).

128

Academic speculation as to why legal scholars failed to appreciate the courts' receptivity
to the challenge is a growth industry. For some recent takes on the matter, see Randy E.
Barnett, No Small Feat: Wo Won the Health Care Case (and Why Did So Many Law Professors

Miss the Boat)?, 65 FIA. L. REv. 1331, 1333 (2013) (arguing law professors did not understand shifting federalism doctrine); see generally David A. Hyman, Why Did Law Professors
Misunderestimatethe Lawsuits Against PPACA?, 2014 U. ILL L. REV. 805 (blaming a confluence of factors including law professors' lack of practice experience, the fact that law professors live in an ideologically narrow echo chamber, the fact that law professors think in
grand theories, bad luck exacerbated by a small sample size of cases, and an intentional
desire to affect the result by making "predictions"); J. Mark Ramseyer, Biases that Bind:
ProfessorHyman and the University, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 1229 (blaming ideological bias).
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not find anyone to argue the other side.12 9 While a cadre of scholars
(who will be discussed below) ultimately emerged to argue strenuously for the unconstitutionality of the mandate, the vast majority of constitutional law professors continued to dismiss the challenge as implausible or even frivolous. When lower courts began to split fairly
evenly in their rulings on the matter, mainstream constitutional
scholars only partially processed the results, still half expecting the
Supreme Court to overwhelmingly reject the claim. When the Court
issued its ruling' 30-finding that the mandate did in fact exceed Congress's Commerce Clause power and only upholding it as a valid exercise of the Taxing Clause power by one vote after a last-minute
change-of-heart by the Chief Justice"'-the majority of so-called experts were left with egg on their (our) faces.
Those in the media, the academy, and the broader political community who had argued for or predicted the Court's embrace of the
challenge properly tried to call the rest of us to account for the failure of our so-called expertise. Central to their critique was the argument that a liberal-leaning constitutional professorate either willfully
distorted the underlying constitutional law (paying insufficient attention to recent decisions more rigorously policing Congress's assertion
of power) or unconsciously confused their own constitutional and political views with those of the Court.13 2

The methodology of this Article suggests another reading, however. The constitutional academy did not so much misread the existing
constitutional law as misread our evolving constitutional culture.
Several significant trends in the institutions and norms governing our
constitutional decisionmaking-none of which have even been
acknowledged by, let alone absorbed into, modern constitutional
theory--created the social conditions in which this challenge could
flourish.
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See Zachary Roth, Debate PlannersCan't Find Anyone to Argue that Health Reform Is Unconstitutional,
TALKING
POINTS
MEMO
(Mar.
31,
2010,
2:09
PM),
http://tpmmuckraker.talkingpointsmemo.com/2010/03/debate-planners-cant-find-an
yone-to-argue-that hea.php (reporting on an event at the University of Washington); see
also Zaid Jilani, College Debate Organizers Unable to Find Any Law Professors to Argue Health Reform
Is
Unconstitutional, THINK
PROGRESS
(Mar.
31,
2010,
12:16
PM),

http://thinkprogress.org/2010/03/31/college-debatehealth/ (same).
See Nat'1 Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct 2566, 2586-87 (2012).
See, e.g., Rachel Weiner, CBS News: John Roberts Changed His Mind on Health-CareMandate,
WASH. POST (July 2, 2012), https://www.washingtonpostcom/blogs/the-fix/post/cbsnews-john-roberts-changed-his-mind-on-health-care-

mandate/2012/07/02/gJQA52JRIW.blog.html.
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First among these is the increasingly partisan process for selecting
and confirming lower federal court judges. As recently as four decades ago, norms and institutional arrangements existed that worked
to depoliticize appointments to federal appellate and district court
judgeships. Presidents relied more on Senators and other elected officials to identify potential nominees (particularly for the District
Court), Senators of opposing parties from the same state worked
more closely together to negotiate appropriate candidates, Presidents
placed greater emphasis on rewarding loyalists and contributors than
on ensuring ideological purity when selecting candidates for the
bench, and Senators were, in turn, less likely to oppose nominees for
ideological reasons.
These norms and institutional arrangements
have not entirely disappeared but they have receded and been joined
by countervailing arrangements and expectations that push in the
other direction. In particular, the White House has taken a much
more active role in identifying first appellate court nominees (during
the 1980s) and then district court nominees (more recently); constituent groups have become more aware of the ramifications of lower
court appointments and more insistent that candidates share their jurisprudential and/or political values; and the White House and Senate have adapted their behavior to more explicitly consider a candidate's projected jurisprudential path when determining who to
appoint and confirm. 134
Press coverage of the courts has both reflected and exacerbated
the increasingly partisan tenor of appellate court nomination politics
by, for example, consistently referencing the President who appointed the participating judges when reporting on lower court rulings.
Though many judges (and occasionally academics) decry those references as reductionist,' they convey short-hand information that the
133

On the evolution of the judicial appointment and confirmation process for lower court
see LEE EPSTEIN & JEFFREY A. SEGAL, ADVICE AND CONSENT: THE POLITICS OF
JUDICIAL APPOINTMENTS 3 (2005); NANCY SCHERER, SCORING POINTS: POLITICIANS,
ACTrISTS, AND THE LOWER FEDERAL COURT APPOINTMENT PROCESS 17 (2005) (explaining
how interest groups and political activists mobilize to influence nominations); Michael A.
Shenkman, Decoupling Districtfrom Circuitjudge Nominations: A Proposal to Put Trial Bench
Confirmations on Track, 65 ARK. L. REV. 217, 249-79 (2012) (describing older practices
and explaining the reasons for their decline).
See generally EPSTEIN & SEGAL, supra note 133; SCHERER, supra note 133.
See, e.g., Erik Eckholm, One Court, Three judges and Four States with Gay Marriage Cases, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 7, 2014, at A15 (referencing which President appointed each judge when reviewing oral arguments before the Sixth Circuit on the constitutionality of state bans on
same-sex marriage).
See, e.g., Kenneth D. Chestek, Competing Stories: A Case Study of the Role of Narrative Reasoning in judicialDecisions, 9 LEGAL COMM. & RHETORIC 99, 122 n.114 (2012) (expressing a
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reporters and the general public consider relevant in assessing contemporary judicial output. Nor is it only individual judges who become identified with particular sides of the political spectrum; over
the last few decades, depictions of the Ninth Circuit as a horde of outof-control leftists and the Fourth Circuit as a pack of constitutional
Neanderthals have seeped into the public consciousness through the
comments of talking heads, the repeated urging of bloggers, and the
occasional long journalistic profile. 7
Though the weight of this effect is a matter of conjecture, the increased focus on the particular partisan orientation of lower courts
and their members influences the manner in which Justices, other
federal judges, and clerks receive their work. As partisan considerations play an increasingly strong role in the selection of judges and as
popular understanding of the process becomes increasingly fixated
on this aspect, participants in the legal culture increasingly see themselves as belonging to one team or another. Once one-either consciously or unconsciously-identifies allies and opponents in the federal judiciary, cognitive biases kick in according greater or lesser
weight to the work of some judges or courts. Empiricists have
demonstrated that these effects play out in complicated and different
ways in different courts, but they nearly uniformly acknowledge their
existence.'" At the most basic level, the effect of this sense of partisan
team membership can be seen in the Supreme Court's extraordinary
tendency to summarily reverse or grant cert to review decisions of the
Ninth Circuit (and to a lesser extent a few other Circuits) on matters
that the Court would not normally consider cert-worthy. 1 3
desire to "debunk" the choice of "most mainstream media commentators" to refer to
judges this way and to use the party of the appointing President as a "metric" of the

judge's ideology).
137

See, e.g., Deborah Sontag, The Power of the Fourth, N.Y. TIMES. MAG., Mar. 9, 2003 (long and
controversial cover-story profiling Fourth Circuit as extremely reactionary); THE NINTH
CIRCUIT WATCH, http://www.the9thcircuitwatch.com/recent.htm (last visited Aug. 21,
2014) (reporting exclusively on the "incomprehensible" decisions of the Ninth Circuit).
Appointments over the last decade have made Sontag's description of the Fourth Circuit
outdated, to the extent it was ever accurate. News accounts now routinely categorize the
Fifth Circuit as the nation's most reactionary appellate court. See, e.g., Mark Curriden,
Meet the ChiefJudge of the Nation's Most Divisive, Controversialand Conservative Appeals Court,
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(Feb.

1,

2014),

http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/meetthe-chief-judge-of the-nations m
ost divisive controversial/.
See, e.g., Richard L. Revesz, EnvironmentalRegulation, [deology, and the D.C. Circuit, 83 VA. L.
REV. 1717 (1997) (identifying partisan effects, exploring issues on which they are more
salient, and explaining how the makeup of a panel affects the level of partisanship).
See generally Kevin M. Scott, Supreme Court Reversals of the Ninth Circuit, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 341
(2006) (discussing possible sources of the relatively high reversal rate of the Ninth Cir-
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The increased partisanship of the lower courts likely played a significant role in the course of the litigation over the individual mandate. When lower court judges faced the constitutional arguments in
the case, they approached them as individuals who, in most cases, had
been appointed through a partisan-tinged confirmation process and
who lived in a culture in which judicial politics was increasingly portrayed in ideological terms. They, in turn, were faced by a case that
had been coded as partisan every step of the way. From both a policy
and an electoral standpoint, the stakes of the case were extremely
high for both political parties. The lawyers in the case were closely
associated with particular sides of the political spectrum, as were the
academics, strategists, and organizations working to shape the arguments.'
When faced with legally defensible arguments on either
side of the issue, it is unsurprising that the original judges deciding
these cases lined up along strictly partisan lines. Once that dynamic
was created, it in turn increased the partisan signaling to judges hearing later iterations of the case. By the time the case came to the Supreme Court, the Justices received a case that, despite a few latedeveloping anomalies at the appellate level, 1 4 1 was thoroughly coded
as presenting a close issue that was likely to break on partisan
grounds.
These dynamics may well have been for naught if it was not for
other recent evolutions in our constitutional culture that provided
space to nurture plausible legal arguments that the mandate was unconstitutional. As some very insightful recent scholarship has explained, the legal campaign was nurtured by an overlapping network
of conservative and libertarian think tanks, legal organizations, and
social networks that brought advocates, academics, and policy scholars together to brainstorm about ways to translate their instincts that
the mandate was federal over-reaching into potentially persuasive legal arguments to that effect.'4 2 The campaign relied heavily on the
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cuit, including an ideological explanation for the reversal rate); cf Dan Horn, 6th Circuit
on Losing Streak in Supreme Court Cases, USA TODAY (Feb. 20, 2011, 1:34 AM),
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/nation/2011-02-20-circuit-courtN.htm.
See, e.g., Kevin Sack, Lawyer Opposing Health Care Law is FamiliarFace to justices, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct 27, 2011, at Al (explaining that Paul Clement, the lawyer litigating the case for the
challengers, was a former Solicitor General under President George W. Bush whose "caseload reads like the Republican Party platform").
See, e.g., Seven-Sky v. Holder, 661 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (Silberman, J.) (voting to uphold minimal essential coverage provisions of the Affordable Care Act); Thomas More
Law Ctr. v. Obama, 651 F.3d 529, 558 (6th Cir. 2011) (Sutton,J., concurring) (same).
See, e.g., JOSH BLACKMAN, UNPRECEDENTED:
THE CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGE TO
OBAMACARE 220-27 (2013); Jack M. Balkin, From Off the Wall to On the Wall: How the Mandate
Challenge
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THE
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(June
4,
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opportunities that electronic communications, and particularly blogging, provided to develop arguments in real time and obtain rapid
feedback from the appropriate communities. While many more traditional constitutional scholars from the left, center, and even the
right laughed off the challenge as a "normatively vacuous precedent
slalom," 4 3 interpretive entrepreneurs such as Randy Barnett developed both a narrative (that the mandate was an "unprecedented" exercise of federal power) and a set of doctrinal arguments designed to
mobilize public opposition to the legislation and to convince those
Justices that were already sympathetic that they might plausibly reach
their desired conclusions.'"
Much more can be said about this episode, but, for the purposes
of this part, the central point is clear: the emergence of new norms,
technologies, arrangements, and relationships have the potential to
shift the landscape of constitutional litigation, both altering the universe of possible constitutional rulings and shifting the probabilities
of different results within that universe. Constitutional lawyers and
theorists who do not take into account shifts in the norms, practices,
and arrangements that constitute our constitutional culture-or
worse yet do not make space in their theories for an account of constitutional culture-are likely to prospectively misjudge and retrospectively misunderstand the constitutional law that our evolving culture produces.
Like many of the descriptive points in this article, this one comes
with a normative corollary: as constitutional institutions and norms
are in constant flux, one must be careful not to judge the actions of
contemporary constitutional actors by anachronistic standards. Many
of the leading figures in constitutional law have looked askance at the
behavior of the academics and lawyers who strategized against the
health care mandate using unconventional methods and persevered
http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2012/06/from off the wall to on the wall
how the mandate challenge went mainstream/258040/. Cf RANDY E. BARNETT ET AL., A
CONSPIRACY AGAINST OBAMACARE:

THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY AND THE HEALTH CARE CASE

(2013) (collecting blog posts developing and popularizing claims of the law's challengers). It should be noted that the effort to use legal tools to overturn or declaw the health
care law did not end with the NFIB decision. See King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2485
(2015) (rejecting a statutory challenge to a key provision of the act); Burwell v. Hobby
Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2759 (2014) (requiring the provision to some corporations of religious exemptions from the statute's mandate).
143
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in their advocacy in the face of a strong professional consensus that
the proper reading of the existing caselaw defeated their challenge
(or at the behavior of the judges who accepted their novel arguments) .
In offering such a critique, however, they have largely relied upon ideas about the role of judges, the nature of constitutional
litigation, and the structure of doctrine that-while characteristic of a
particular era and perhaps even broadly resonant with the American
experience-are neither timeless nor uncontested. Scholars canand should-engage in a productive debate about the desirability of
the kinds of cultural changes described in this subpart, but they must
strive to understand and debate them on their own terms rather than
rejecting them as inconsistent with an underlying constitutional
structure that is at best ephemeral.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL CULTURE

Thus far, this Article has offered two substantial criticisms of the
manner in which contemporary constitutional theory takes account
of constitutional practice. In Part I, I voiced skepticism about theorists' assumption that some of our most familiar constitutional practices and arrangements reflect a permanent or inherent constitutional "structure"; arguing to the contrary, I demonstrated that many
such features are instead the product of nominal factors, historical
contingencies, and express contestation that continues to this day.'4
In Part II, I expressed parallel concern about the degree to which
constitutional theory ignores or underplays the importance of newer,
messier, or more controversial constitutional practices and arrangements and demonstrated that many such features do, in fact, play a
substantial role in the process of making constitutional law. 4 1
This Part moves from criticism to construction, offering a framework through which constitutional theorists and constitutional commentators more generally might study, analyze, and critique contemporary constitutional arrangements, practices, and norms. Its starting
point is the belief that there is little to analytically or conceptually dis145

For characteristically harsh criticism, see, for example, Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Charlie Savage,
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TIMES

(Mar.

26,

2012),

http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/27/us/randy-barnetts-pet-cause-end-of-health-lawhits-supreme-court.html (quoting one leading academic as saying that Randy Barnett has
"gotten an amazing amount of attention for an argument that he created out of whole
cloth" and that "[u]nder existing case law this is a very easy case; this is obviously constitutional").
See generally supra Part I.
See generally supra Part II.
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tinguish the practices, arrangements, and norms discussed in Part I
from those discussed in Part II; in both instances, the features I discuss are crucially important yet historically contingent attributes of
our current constitutional decisionmaking regime that might beneficially be theorized together. In its simplest form, my framework suggests that we ought to think of all of these features-whether old or
new, ingrained or tentative, salutary or troubling-as attributes of a
''constitutional culture."
In Part III.A, I give content to that term, explaining the ideas that
I want to invoke with this particular construction. In Part III.B, I then
defend my particular nomenclature, explaining both how my use of
the term "constitutional culture" differs from the meaning intended
by other scholars who have used a similar construction and whyprior claimants notwithstanding-I prefer this terminology to other
plausible alternatives. Finally, in Part III.C, I offer a conceptual map
of the many different kinds of constitutional practices that might
helpfully be brought under the umbrella of "constitutional culture."
A. Substance and Themes
"Constitutional culture" is the black box through which the Constitution's words are transformed into concrete consequences. It is
an interlocking system of practices, institutional arrangements,
norms, and habits of thought that determine what questions we ask,
what arguments we credit, how we process disputes, and how we resolve those disputes. It is, by definition, vast and slippery.
To study constitutional decisionmaking through the lens of constitutional culture is, for all practical purposes, to commit oneself to a
series of assumptions about the ways in which those features develop
and interact. First, the very notion of constitutional culture suggests
that the arrangements governing constitutional decisionmaking at
any one time are time- and place-specific. As the first two Parts of this
Article have mapped out, our constitutional norms and practices are
ever in flux, adapting and changing to better reflect the preferences,
expectations, hopes, and fears of a people who are themselves everadapting. 4 ' Accurate answers to questions about how we make constitutional law are definitionally time-limited.

148

This Article intentionally brackets many of the difficult interpretive questions raised by
the concept of "culture" including: (1) how intentional the process of cultural adaptation is; (2) whether culture is largely reflective of elite values and preferences or meaningfully takes into account the interests and preferences of the broader society; and (3)
whether cultural forms are primarily reflective of underlying economic structures or are
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That characteristic notwithstanding, the content of our constitutional culture is deeply historicized in at least two ways. First, the particular arrangements and norms that exist are the result of particular
historical incidents, movements, decisions, and adaptations. We
can-and, in fact, often do-explain the evolution of our modern
structures with references to their triggering events or the broader
cultural movements that advocated their adoption.1 49 Constitutional
culture is nominal, in the sense that it exists in its particular form at
any given moment because of the particular course that history has
taken and would be at least a little bit different-and in many cases
greatly different-in any of the millions of alternate worlds that
might have existed.
Second, many of the features of our constitutional culture are
deeply entrenched, in some cases so rooted in our history that alternatives cease to be visible or are visible only around the margins. The
fact that institutional arrangements, practices, and habits of thought
are contingent and evolutionary does not mean that they are at any
given moment perceived as malleable or as subjects of explicit normative debate. To the contrary, the fact that our constitutional institutions and practices are the result of a process of historical adaptation often facilitates the illusion that they are permanent, either
because they fit so tightly with the values and assumptions of the current generation or because they seem they product of hard-earned
wisdom. 150
To think of constitutional institutions, practices, and norms as a
species of culture also highlights the degree to which they are subject
to rational arguments for their modification but also reflective of
deeper, more guttural, more inchoate commitments. We can and do
recognize and debate specific proposals to improve on the ways in
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meaningfully independent from them. While both macro- and micro-level answers to
these questions are crucial to many of the projects laid out in Parts IV and V below, they
are tangential to this Article's critique.
For example, we see many of the features of our current judicial culture, such as the relatively aggressive remedial role of the judge and the legitimacy of impact litigation strategies, as products of mid-twentieth-century civil rights litigation. We similarly point to the
experiences of the New Deal era to explain both the necessity of protecting the formal
independence of the courts and the importance of developing doctrinal structures that
can serve the needs of the modern polity.
For example, our unwillingness to countenance politically-motivated judicial impeachments is seen as a lesson learned during the Jeffersonian era, while our resistance to alterations in the size of the Court (once a common tactic) is seen as a lesson learned during the New Deal's "Court Packing" crisis. On the former, see ELLIS, supra note 67 at 67109; on the latter, see JEFF SHESHOL, SUPREME POWER: FRANKLIN ROOSEVELT VS. THE
SUPREME COURT 59 (2010).
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which our constitutional decisionmaking process operates, by, for example, changing our norms as to the proper training for judges, 5 1
limiting the use of amicus briefs,'5 2 or altering our interpretive algorithm to privilege particular modalities of constitutional argument.
Yet, we do not do so in a vacuum; rather, we come to such discussions
motivated by a set of values and a series of instinctual assumptions
about what is important, what is possible, and how the world really
works. These deeper commitments-our worldview-shape the vocabulary we use, the arguments we credit, and the issues we perceive
or ignore.
Further, the notion of a constitutional culture emphasizes the interrelationships between our ideational structures and our more concrete institutional arrangements. Just as cultural history serves as a
1514
bridge between intellectual and social history, So too can the analysis of constitutional culture serve as a bridge between doctrinal and
institutionalist accounts of our constitutional evolution. The constitutional culture construct in part achieves this objective by identifying
both doctrinal tests and interpretive strategies (on the one hand) and
court calendars and law clerk staffing practices (on the other) as cultural products. In addition, it further breaks down the dichotomy by
focusing our attention on the way in which inchoate assumptions and
undertheorized attitudes influence our receptivity to both particular
doctrinal formulations and particular institutional arrangements.
Finally, focusing on our constitutional decisionmaking process as
a system of culture frees us up to discuss both revered and newfangled practices and norms in similar ways and in conjunction with
each other. Just as cultural historians engage with both haughty high
culture and gritty pop culture subjects,'55 mining both for insights and
often drawing connections between them, so too must scholars of a
constitutional culture. If our goal is to understand both how and why
constitutional law is made in this particular time and place, we ought
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See, e.g., EPSTEIN & SEGAL, supra note 133, at 17 (discussing efforts to impose priorjudicial

service as a qualification for Supreme Court appointment and assessing its consequences,
both intended and unintended).
See Smith, supra note 93, at 24 (discussing reforms that imposed some limits on amicus
briefs at the Supreme Court and substantial limits at the Seventh Circuit).
See supra notes 52-53 and accompanying text (discussing the effort to reform constitutional decisionmaking to privilege originalist arguments).
For an introduction to the themes and varied objects of cultural history, see generally
PETER BURKE, WHAT IS CULTURAL HISTORY (2d ed. 2008).
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to interrogate the various institutions, practices, norms, and habits of
thought that we encounter, assessing both the symbolic and the practical importance of each, without regard to their tenure or their perceived moral valence.
B. The Nomenclature

"Constitutional culture" is a fairly common term in the legal academic literature, appearing well over a thousand times in widely
available articles."'6 Despite-or perhaps because of-the frequency
with which it is invoked, the phrase does not possess a single consistent or even primary meaning. One substantial strand of articles
that utilizes the term uses it to refer to constitutional ideas and
movements occurring outside the courts, setting up a dichotomy between "constitutional law" and "constitutional culture.""' A second
significant set of articles, primarily but not exclusively in the international and comparative law context, uses "constitutional culture" to
refer to the institutional and attitudinal pre-conditions necessary for a
constitutional democracy to thrive.5 Still others use the phrase more
haphazardly to refer generally to ideas about the Constitution or to
trends in constitutional jurisprudence. 5 9
As the above section illustrates, I use the term somewhat differently than most of these authors. To begin with, my notion of constitutional culture is meant to be precise, referencing a large but specific
set of concrete things rather than an undifferentiated zeitgeist or a
set of ideas about the Constitution that are insufficiently concrete to
be classified as constitutional argument. Moreover, my focus is on
the elements of the constitutional system rather than the cultural
prerequisites for implementing one. Finally, my conception of "constitutional culture" is not limited to the habits of thought and institu156
157
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A search of the Westlaw "JLR" database conducted on August 21, 2014 reveals 1,661 articles that use the exact term "constitutional culture."
See, e.g., Post, supra note 2; Siegel, supra note 2.
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(2001); John Liolos, Erecting New ConstitutionalCultures: The Problems and Promise of Constitutionalism Post-Arab Spring, 36 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 219 (2013); cf ROBERT F.
NAGEL, CONSTITUTIONAL CULTURES:

THE MENTALITY AND CONSEQUENCES OF JUDICIAL

REVIEW (1989) (discussing, from a highly critical perspective, the consequences of living
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in a culture that is attuned to and comfortable with an assertive judiciary).
See, e.g.,James E. Fleming & Linda C. McClain, Ordered Gun Liberty: Rights with Responsibililies and Regulation, 94 B.U. L. REV. 849, 891 (2014) ("Few rights are more sacrosanct in
our constitutional culture than the individual right to keep and bear arms."); Joseph
Landau, PresidentialConstitutionalism and Civil Rights, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1719, 1736
(2014) (using the term "constitutional culture" to refer to shifting "norms of liberty and
equality").
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tional responses of actors outside the judicial system, but is instead
drawn broadly enough to also encompass the habits of thought and
institutional arrangements that shape the behavior of those inside the
judicial system.
Despite the marked contestation for the name "constitutional culture," there are many reasons to believe that it remains the best term
to describe the historically contingent set of institutions, practices,
and habits of thought through which constitutional law is made. To
begin with, treating these institutions and norms as a form of culture
allows those tasked with mapping out or theorizing about them to tap
into the rich social science literature on "culture," particularly the
work of historians, anthropologists, and literary theorists.6 1

While I

do not propose that constitutional theory adopt the framework of any
particular social scientist or take any particular position on the various inter-disciplinary debates about the nature and evolution of cultural forms,'6' my understanding of the centrality of culture and of its
defining characteristics draws heavily on a lifetime of reading in a variety of disciplines, each of which provides guidance in unpacking the
complicated sets of arrangements, institutions, and norms that shape
our process of contemporary constitutional decisionmaking.
Second, the term "culture" best captures the dualisms described
above and those dualisms are in turn the key defining features of our
constitutional decisionmaking institutions. As detailed in the first
two Parts of this Article, every significant feature in our system for
making constitutional law is (1) contingent and evolving yet deeply
grounded in our history; (2) the subject of some level of intellectual
debate yet also reflective of more inchoate commitments and assumptions; and (3) grounded in a network of other arrangements and
norms that is complicated and mutually reinforcing. Almost any other terminology one might propose-including expressly all the other
formulations I have occasionally drifted into while composing this article-shirks some crucial aspect. To take the simplest example, the
decision of constitutional theorists to describe many of these attributes as our constitutional "structure" has led to an overemphasis on
their stability and permanence of some of our arrangements and the
disregarding of those arrangements that do not meet a certain
threshold on that axis. Similarly, an attempt to characterize the
160

I resist the temptation to identify any of the many historians and social scientists who have
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theorized about "culture" for fear of taking sides unnecessarily in the complicated theoretical and critical debates surrounding "culture." Cf supra note 148 (identifying and
bracketing several such issues).
For some such issues, see supra note 148.
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broad field of constitutional culture in terms of constitutional "institutions" or "practices" deemphasizes the crucial aspects of the culture
that are ideational rather than structural. The notion of a constitutional "process" or "decisionmaking process" suggests a level of formality, orderliness, consistency, and intentionality that does not accurately reflect the messy reality of our daily constitutional life. And
none of these alterative locutions accurately capture the degree to
which our constitutional arrangements, practices, and norms reflect
fundamental truths about who we-at this given moment-are as a
people.
C. The Content of ConstitutionalCulture: A ConceptualMap
As defined above, our constitutional culture is the set of institutional arrangements, practices, norms, habits of thought, and other
miscellaneous features that determine how we get from the Constitution's words to concrete consequences.16 2 These features can be productively sorted into several categories based on their timing and location. 6 3
* Features that determine the makeup of the courts and their personnel: One

set of influential arrangements and norms involve the design of the
courts and the choices of how to populate them. This category of cultural features include the size of the Supreme Court; the existence, size, and
location of the lower federal courts; the rules and norms that govern who
will be appointed and confirmed to the bench; the decision whether to
employ other legal professionals (such as law clerks or staff attorneys)
and the mechanisms used for selecting them.
*

Features that determine what issues will be presented for judicial review and

how they will be framed: Another set of influential norms and practices involve the distilling of unrest into concrete constitutional claims and the
shaping of such claims for judicial review. This category includes norms
and habits of thought about the courts' proper relationship to other
branches and about the kinds of disputes appropriately resolved through
constitutional litigation; rules and professional practices that set the cost
of and determine the ease of raising particular claims before the courts;
institutional arrangements and technological developments that make it
easier or harder for individuals or groups to develop and test new and
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See supra Part HIA.
This rough conceptual map is meant to demonstrate the breadth of practices, norms,
arrangements, and ideational structures that might profitably be theorized under the rubric of constitutional culture, while also offering some provisional analytic categories that
might facilitate the process of breaking down and analyzing this broad subject. It is not
meant to offer either a complete catalog of the features of our constitutional culture or a
definitive taxonomy of the categories into which one might want to sort these features.
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creative constitutional arguments; and doctrinal structures and habits of
thought that channel constitutional thinking down particular paths.
*

Features that determine how the courts will process and resolve these issues- A

third-and particularly broad-category of influential cultural features
involves the processing of disputes by the judiciary and the determination and production of some sort of judicial response. This category includes norms, practices, and arrangements for briefing and arguing cases; rules, practices, and norms for determining whether, when, and how
courts will produce written opinions in those cases; norms and habits of
thought that shape opinion authors' perception of their options and
choices among those options; and institutional and political arrangements that shape judges' receptivity to different categories of claims, arguments, and litigants.
* Features that determine how those outside the courts will process and react to
judicial decisions (or will act independently in the pursuit of constitutional

norms): The fourth major category of significant features of our constitutional culture encompasses those that involve extra-judicial interpretation, implementation, and resistance to judicial decisions. This category
involves the mechanisms through which relevant constituencies and the
population at large become aware of the content of judicial decisions,
the nature and prevalence of other institutional actors with the ability to
shape popular understanding of such decisions, and the norms and arrangements that determine both whether other political and social actors
feel compelled to follow or to resist judicial decisions and their ability to
successfully do so.16 It also includes a sub- or parallel-category that involves the existence of norms and arrangements that determine the frequency which and the manners in which individuals and grou s pursue
their constitutionally-motivated goals in extra-judicial settings.

IV. TowARDS A NEW PARADIGM?
In the prior Parts, I have argued that constitutional theory often
treats constitutional practice in misleading and unhelpful waysm and
that our collective theoretical enterprise might be enhanced by developing and deploying a theoretically rich concept of constitutional
In this Part, I emphasize the collective aspect of this proculture.'
ject, first by offering examples of the kinds of scholarly studies that
164

These dynamics garnered extensive attention in the two years between the Supreme
Court's decisions in United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) and Obergefell v. Hodges,
135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) as a full panoply of engaged public actors (including lawyers, state
courts, federal courts, interest groups, and citizens) participated in a multi-faceted dialogue and contest over the meaning of the Supreme Court's decision in Windsor for samesex marriage rights.

165

On these issues, see infra Part IV.B; see also LEVINSON, supra note 2, at 129 (emphasizing
the importance of such settings).
See supraParts I-II (discussing the tension between constitutional theory and practice).
See supra Part m (arguing for an increased role for constitutional culture in developing

166
167

theory).
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might forward our collective understanding of constitutional culture
and then by highlighting and engaging a diverse set of contemporary
works that utilize methodologies or probe questions in tune with the
constitutional culture approach.
A. An IntellectualAgenda

One can imagine a wide variety of works that might contribute to
our understanding of the dynamics of our contemporary constitutional culture. Much of that work is descriptive. At the macro-level,
we would benefit greatly from book-length studies that map our constitutional culture or significant aspects of it (such as Supreme Court
decisionmaking) in thick and nuanced ways, utilizing the tools of anthropology and cultural history. Such studies might be expressly historical, focusing on change over time, or more directly presentist,
preferring instead to draw layered portraits of contemporary institutions. At their heart, however, such projects would seek to be fairly
comprehensive (cataloging the various norms, arrangements, practices, and habits of thought that shape and channel the making of
contemporary constitutional law) and would pay attention to the subtle connections between the various features (mapping out not just
which ones exist but the ways in which they reinforce and undermine
each other and their shared intellectual and cultural roots).
On the micro-level, one can imagine a variety of descriptive projects that study particular institutional arrangements (such as the rise
of amicus briefing, changes in opinion-writing protocols, or changing
norms about the proper credentials for federal judges) as evolving
cultural forms, analyzing both the reasons why they emerged at this
particular time and their influence on and implications for the substance of our constitutional decisionmaking. One might also define
projects that take particular cases, issues, or themes and treat them as
"episodes" in constitutional culture, unpacking the various institutional arrangements, norms, and features that directed the course of
the case, defined the parameters of our interaction with the issue, or
explained the prominence of the theme. One might imagine thorough works from this perspective exploring the Lawrence,'68 Kelo,m6 or

168

Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). Cf DALE CARPENTER, FLANGRANT CONDUCT:
THE STORY OF LAwRENCe . TExAs (2012) (offering a thorough account of this case that offers insights into how constitutional culture affected the course of case, though only in
passing).

169

Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
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Health Care cases;"o our post-9/11 engagement with the Constitution
and terror; or the Supreme Court's modem aversion to litigation."'
Such works would inform in their own right and serve as case studies
of modem constitutional decisionmaking.
The constitutional culture perspective also suggests an evaluative
and normative agenda. In particular, it would behoove us to see
works of constitutional theory that adopt the insights of this article,
developing frameworks that acknowledge the contingent and evolving nature of our institutions and norms and that integrate into their
analysis more recent developments such as the rise of law clerks, the
changing role of amicus briefs, and the increased prominence of talking heads and press releases for the public consumption of Supreme
Court opinions. Such works would evaluate our system of constitutional decisionmaking in a clear-headed way, focusing on how constitutional law is made in the real world today, rather than in some ideal
world or in a world abstracted from our broader historical experience. It is likely that scholars approaching our constitutional culture
from different perspectives might reach vastly different normative
and evaluative conclusions. For example, one might imagine a relaconstitutional
contemporary
of
critique
scathing
tively
decisionmaking focused on the ways in which the rise of the Internet,
increased partisanship, the growing influence of law clerks, and pervasive mediating of constitutional content through talking heads degrade the features that justified a pronounced judicial role in the first
place. Alternatively, one might imagine an equally impassioned defense of our contemporary constitutional culture that portrayed our
institutions and practices evolving to become more representative
and participatory, in ways that undercut the standard countermajoritarian critique.
B. An EmergingLiterature
While I am staking out an intellectual agenda with an eye towards
future work, there is already a developing literature that shares common influences and insights with the constitutional theory project.
At the macro-level, one might look at the work of Barry Friedman,
170

171

Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). Cf BLACKMAN, supra note
142 (offering a provocative account of this case well-attuned to some crucial aspects of
constitutional culture).
Cf Andrew M. Siegel, The Court Against the Courts: Hostility to Litigation as an Organizing

Theme in the Rehnquist CourtsJurisprudence,84 TEX. L. REv. 1097, 1107 (2006) (making a
doctrinal case for this theme and explaining it as a cultural phenomenon, but only superficially probing the cultural factors that shaped and channeled it).
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who has repeatedly encouraged constitutional theorists to take into
account the lessons of positive political theory;12 Richard Fallon, who
has offered an account of constitutional decisionmaking that pays
particular attention to the institutions and norms through which
judges make their decisions; 73 or of the various theorists who have
spoken in defense of a more explicitly political judiciary.I74 On a
more micro-level, Josh Blackman's book about the healthcare cases
focuses attention on many of the recent cultural innovations that
shaped the course of the case, 75 while other scholars have written
persuasive and nuanced accounts of particular constitutional practices and institutions, such as the evolving role of amicus briefs,'76 the
influence of law clerks, 77 or the reemergence of a specialized Supreme Court bar."' Moreover, on a less tangible level, the constitutional culture perspective shares a spirit with the critical project of
scholars such as Derrick Bell who challenged the efforts of constitutional scholars to portray constitutional interpretation as an abstract
intellectual exercise rather than as a site for political contestation,
cultural adaptation, and even the exercise of raw power. 1
As one constitutional scholar recently noted in the Harvard Law
Review, recent years have-as a general matter-seen a proliferation
of academic works highlighting the degree to which constitutional

172
173

174
175

176
177
178

See, e.g., Barry Friedman, The Importanceof Being Positive: The Nature and Function offudicial
Review, 72 U. CIN. L. REv. 1257 (2004).
See, e.g., FALLON, supra note 2; FALLON, supranote 23 (arguing that shaping constitutional

doctrines requires the Supreme Court to make practical judgments without singular regard to the Constitution's orgininal meaning).
See, e.g., TERRIJENNINGS PERETTi, IN DEFENSE OF A POLITICAL COURT (1999).
BLACKMAN, supra note 142.
See, e.g., Kearney & Merrill, supra note 79, at 747 (discussing the evolving role and varied
perspectives of third party amicus filings).
See, e.g., PEPPERS, supra note 78 (examining the utilization of Supreme Court law clerks
and their potential influence on Supreme Court decision-making).
See, e.g., RichardJ. Lazarus, Advocacy Matters Before and Within the Supreme Court: Transform-

ing the Court by Transforming the Bar, 96 GEO. L.J. 1487 (2008) (arguing that although today's Supreme Court bar is less significant than in years past, there has been a strong increase in the number and influence of today's Supreme Court litigators).
179

See, e.g., Derrick Bell, Essay-ConstitutionalConflicts: The Perils and Rewards of Pioneeringin

the Law School Classroom, 21 SEATTLE U. L. REv. 1039, 1043 (1998) ("The singular and key
understanding at which I would hope every student arrives is that rather than a revered
relic bequeathed by the Founding Fathers, to be kept under glass and occasionally dusted, the Constitution is a living document, one locus of battle over the shape of our society, where differing visions of what should be, compete to become what is, and what will
be.").
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developments reflect broader cultural forces."" These works 1 ' take
different forms, adopt different methodologies, and forward diverse
normative agendas, but they share a common conviction that the
process of making constitutional law is deeply enmeshed in the particular cultural currents of a given time and place.1 82
The intellectual forces nourishing this cultural turn are remarkably diverse. Many of the scholars who write about constitutional law
in these terms are historically-trained and thus temperamentally and
professionally inclined to identify cultural connections and to appreciate the nominal and contingent aspects of constitutional evolution. 1 3 Quite a few draw explicit inspiration from the work of Derrick
Bell and other early critical race scholars who conceptualized constitutional law as a site for political contestation and contingent experOthers have been pushed in this direction by an apimentation.
preciation for the lessons of positive political theory and a
concomitant concern about the descriptive inaccuracies sustained by
constitutional theory's unwillingness to engage that literature.1
Modem events have also spurred the trend to think about constitutional law in contingent and cultural terms. Some of the most interesting and creative contemporary thinking about the dynamics of
constitutional lawmaking has emerged from scholarly projects de180

181

182

183
184

185

See Horwitz, supra note 8, at 157 ("A great deal of recent constitutional scholarship has
examined the relationship between social and legal change, and between social movements and courts.").
See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, Principles, Practices, and Social Movements, 154 U.
PA. L. REv. 927 (2006) (examining the ways in which longstanding constitutional principles and practices often call each other's authority into question); Tomiko Brown-Nagin,
Elites, Social Movements, and the Law: The Case of Affirmative Action, 105 COLUM. L. REV.
1436 (2005); William N. Eskridge,Jr., Some Effects of Identity Based Social Movements on Con
stitutionalLaw in the Twentieth Century, 100 MICH. L. REv. 2062 (2002) (arguing that most
twentieth-century changes in the jurisprudence of individual rights were the result of
widespread social movements); Guinier & Torres, supra note 113 (arguing that the social
movements of the civil rights era were sources of law); Horwitz, supra note 8; Klarman,
supra note 8 (arguing that social and cultural factors made possible the landmark cases
concerning racial and marriage equality); Post, supra note 2 (noting the Supreme Court's
deference to liberal political attitudes in 2002).
Though to many this observation might appear almost obvious or even tautological, this
Article has suggested that it remains in tension with a central strand of modern constitutional theory that has taken as its object a relatively rigid and abstracted vision of constitutional practice.
See, e.g., Brown-Nagin, supra note 181; Klarman, supranote 8; Post, supranote 2.
See, e.g., Brown-Nagin, supra note 181, at 1471 (borrowing from Derrick Bell's work to
discuss affirmative action in university admissions); Guinier & Torres, supra note 113, at
2748 (citing to Derrick Bell's argument that culture influenced affirmative action jurisprudence).
See, e.g., Friedman, supra note 172 (discussing the close relationship between the law,
American culture, and politics).
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signed to explain the rapid pace of constitutional change in areas
such as same-sex marriage,' religious liberty,8 7 the scope of Congress's powers,' 8 and the Second Amendment.'" In a similar but less
dramatic vein, our culture's increased attention to the details of Supreme Court practice and deliberation have played a central role in
nourishing the kind of thick and careful descriptions of particular
constitutional practices referenced above."
The central focus that originalism has served in shaping our constitutional debates has also played an under-appreciated and somewhat ironic role in encouraging scholarship mapping out the contours of our constitutional culture. As an ability to understand and
mobilize arguments about historical practice and constitutional design have come to be a sine qua non for participation in modern debates about both constitutional theory and substantive constitutional
law,"' scholars of all ideological stripes have become more adept at
exploring our constitutional institutions, understanding the constitutional practices and assumptions that characterized different eras,
and identifying the dynamics and levers that have propelled constitutional change. Across the political spectrum, scholars steeped in these methods and replete with the knowledge that they have accumulated, have produced important work filling in crucial details about
our constitutional practices and historically contingent traditions.' 2
Finally, on a more personal level, few, if any, have done more to
forward academic awareness of the complicated relationships between cultural forces, constitutional practice, and constitutional doctrine than the linked quartet of Sandy Levinson, Jack Balkin, Robert
Post, and Reva Siegel.'" In decades of books and articles too numerSee, e.g., Klarman, supra note 8.

See, e.g., Horwitz, supra note 8 (commenting on the strong relationship between the social
and political factors that influenced statutory interpretation in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby
Stores, Inc.).
See, e.g., BLACKMAN, supra note 142.
See, e.g., Greene, supra note 53.
See, e.g., PEPPERS, supra note 78 (discussing the rising interest in law clerks); Kearney
Merrill, supra note 79 (evaluating the increased role of amicus briefs); Lazarus, supra note
178 (discussing the reemergence of a Supreme Court bar).
See, e.g., Jamal Greene, Heller High Water? The Future of Originalism, 3 HARV. L & POL'Y
REv. 325, 325 n.3 (2009) (collecting sources arguing that all sides in recent debates have
been conversant in originalist arguments).
For such works by critics of originalism, see, for example, POWELL, supra note 2, at 6-7;
Greene, supra note 53, at 661. For such works by scholars more sympathetic to

188
189
190

191

192

&

186

187

originalism, see, for example, Caleb Nelson, Originalism and Interpretive Conventions, 70 U.
CHI. L. REV. 519, 521-23 (2003); Young, supra note 10, at 410.

193

Some might include in this group Akhil Reed Amar, whose prolific and original projects
often, though not always, show the influence of their work. See, e.g., Amar, supra note 10,
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ous and complicated to unpack here,194 they have explored the contours of these overlapping forces,'9 5 asked crucial questions about
what techniques have worked for mobilizing constitutional values in
the pursuit of equality and justice,'96 and pointedly criticized central
aspects of our constitutional design.'9 7 Through their prolific exploration of these questions and their frequent participation in seminars, mentoring activities, and co-written projects with other scholars,
they have been instrumental in opening a second front in the neverending scholarly struggle to understand our Constitution, one much
more in line with the perspective of this project.'
C. Moving Beyond the Existing Literature

The works discussed above share similarities in assumptions and
approach to the constitutional culture framework proposed in this
article, but, with rare exceptions,'" limit their insights to particular
incidents or contexts, rather than attempting to offer broad insights
into the process of constitutional decisonmaking. Even those that at-

194
195

196

197

at 27-28 (offering an account of constitutional decisionmaking emphasizing the role of
choices steeped in culture, personality, and contingency).
For some of their leading works, see supra note 2.
See, e.g., Balkin & Siegel, supra note 181, at 929 (arguing that political contestation can
alter people's understanding of constitutional principles); Post, supra note 2, at 8 (arguing that constitutional law both shapes and is shaped by the beliefs and values of
nonjudicial actors); Siegel, supra note 2, at 1324 (discussing the interactions between citizens and officials that inspire constitutional change); Post & Siegel, supra note 53, at 54950 (exploring the historical processes that have shaped constitutional law).
See, e.g., BALKIN, supra note 2, at 4-5 (claiming that a narrative of redemption rather than
one of consistently achieving greater equality and justice provides a more accurate history
of the American nation); Post, supra note 2, at 81-83 (explaining that courts must take into consideration changing cultural notions of equality); Siegel, supra note 2, at 1327 (analyzing the impact of mobilized citizens and social movements on constitutional law).
See,

e.g.,

SANFORD

LEVINSON,

OUR UNDEMOCRATIC

CONSTITUTION:

WHERE

THE

CONSTITUTION GOES WRONG (AND How WE THE PEOPLE CAN CORRECT IT) 6 (2006) ("I

believe that it is increasingly difficult to construct a theory of democratic constitutionalism, applying our own twenty-first century norms, that vindicates the Constitution under which

198

we are goverened today.").
For an insightful discussion of their collective project, in terms consistent with the project
of this Article, see Douglas NeJaime, Constitutional Change, Courts, and Social Movements,
111 MICH. L. REv. 877, 877 (2013) (reviewing JACK M. BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL
REDEMPTION: POLITICAL FAITH IN AN UNJUST WORLD (2011)) (discussing Balkin's schol-

arship on social movements and the role of courts in shaping constitutional law).
199

See, e.g., POWELL, supra note 2, at 2-3 (noting that when people think of the Constitution,

they think of the political practice of courts rather than the document itself); Post, supra
note 2, at 8 (exploring the ways in which the Constitution is and is not independent from
the beliefs of nonjudicial actors); Siegel, supra note 2, at 1324-25 (resisting the separation
between lawmaking and interpretation in order to focus on constitutional change shaped
by interactions between citizens and officials).
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tempt to draw broader lessons from their analysis often fail to appreciate the degree to which their approach offers a fundamental challenge to mainstream constitutional theory, particularly when aggregated with the insights of like-minded scholars. To the extent that
these books and articles represent manifestations of a new paradigm
in constitutional law and theory, it is a paradigm that has yet to be fully acknowledged, let alone fully theorized.
Moreover, to the extent that the current literature on constitutional culture and constitutional practice either explicitly or implicitly stakes out a theoretical model of constitutional decisionmaking,
there are departures as well as similarities from the approach suggested by this Article. First, as mentioned above200 and discussed in
more detail below,'' the primary focus of such works is on how
events, ideas, and movements from the broader culture influence the
work product of courts, at times coupled with a reciprocal interest in
how the courts' decisions in turn affect the broader culture.202 This
Article suggests a perspective that understands both the nature of
"constitutional culture" and the process of constitutional
decisionmaking more broadly. As will be fleshed out more fully below,20s the constitutional culture approach sketched out in these pag-

es very explicitly treats questions about how we staff the courts and
structure its work as aspects of culture that cannot meaningfully be
disentangled from other cultural forms. Further, this Article takes a
broader view of the aspiration of constitutional theory, positing an
approach that asks questions and seeks answers about the concrete
consequences of constitutional text and thought rather than about
the doctrinal and decisional law that we craft in the name of the Constitution.
Second, some of the very best works on how history, politics, and
culture have shaped our constitutional practices artificially truncate
their time horizons, giving rise to the misperception that we have

200
201
202

See supra text accompanying notes 157-159.
See infra Part V.B.
See, e.g., Balkin & Siegel, supranote 181, at 928-29 (considering how political contestation
affects the way people think about constitutional principles and how principles that were
once accepted become controversial when applied to new situations); Eskridge, supra
note 181, at 2064 (arguing that twentieth-century changes in the constitutional protection of individual rights were the result of social movements); Post, supra note 2, at 8 (exploring the relationship between constitutional law and culture); Siegel, supra note 2, at
1324 (examining the interaction between citizens and officials that effectuate constitutional change).

203

See infra Part VA-B.
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evolved into a stable constitutional structure.204 While appreciating
the contingency of our practices, institutional arrangements, and
habits of thought, such studies, either intentionally or unintentionally, lapse into some of the flaws of mainstream constitutional theory:
over-emphasizing the stability of our current constitutional culture,
minimizing or ignoring newer constitutional practices, sacrificing nuanced portraits of our practices and institutions at a particular time
for flattened portraits generally true over broader time periods, and
205
letting in wisps of Whigish glee at how well things have turned out.

While often extraordinarily successful on their own terms, these
works ultimately stem from a project different from-and only partially compatible with-that of this Article.
V.

THEMES AND OBSERVATIONS

Though the primary purposes of this Article are to critique the existing ways in which constitutional theory deals with constitutional
practice and to offer an alternative framework for doing so, along the
way I have, by necessity, developed a variety of substantive observations and hypotheses about both constitutional theory and constitutional culture. This Part concludes the Article by sketching out some
of these observations and some related themes.
A. The BizarreFetishizationof theJudicial Opinion

Most constitutional scholarship-whether theoretical, descriptive,
or predictive-is intensely focused on the judicial opinion. At some
level, this fascination with what judges say is understandable as judicial opinions are the prime text in the law school classroom, the
prime method of communication for federal judges, and the most
easily accessible primary source in constitutional analysis. Still, on
even modest reflection, constitutional analysis that focuses on the
process by which the document's words are translated into judicial
opinions is incomplete. Constitutional opinions are a tool-albeit
almost certainly the single most crucial tool-for transmitting constitutional ideas and encouraging particular constitutional consequences, but they are only a tool.
To talk about the process of constitutional decisionmaking as the
process through which judicial opinions are produced is to mistake a
204
205

For a classic example, see POWELL, supranote 2, at 7 (arguing that constitutional law is a
"coherent tradition" that is best understood when viewed through a historical lens).
For discussion of these flaws, see supra Part I.
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means for an end or a stage of the process for the process itself. To
get a full picture of how constitutional law becomes an effective force
in people's lives, with concrete consequences for their well-being, requires studying not only what the courts say, but also how those words
are transmitted, understood, manipulated, evaded, and enforced.
Judicial rulings at times have significant consequences even when issued without opinions, have limited consequences despite sweeping
accompanying opinions, or have consequences drastically different
than one might project from even the most careful reading of the
opinions.
The constitutional culture perspective pushes back against constitutional scholarship's overwhelming tendency to fetishize the opinion. If the norms and practices of opinion writing are simply one set
of nominal, contingent, and evolving features that comprise our constitutional culture, then there is no real analytically sound reason to
focus exclusively on the document they produce while ignoring the
parallel features that govern its absorption and implementation.
Moreover, the characterization of constitutional decisionmaking as a
system of culture highlights the degree to which constitutional law is
not an abstract intellectual enterprise but is instead a field in which
human beings engage with and against each other to achieve concrete objectives, to shape the contours of their lives, and to develop
systems that explain and derive meaning from those lives.m
B. The ArtificialBifurcation of "ConstitutionalLaw" and "Constitutional
Culture"

On a related note, my approach leads me to question the beliefexplicit in some constitutional scholarship20 and implicit in mostthat "constitutional law" and "constitutional culture" are separate and
discrete things. As discussed above, 2081 many theorists who utilize the
term "constitutional culture" use the term to represent ideas about
the Constitution and institutional arrangements related to constitutional issues that exist outside the courts. In Part III, I explained why
my terminology differed from theirs. Here, I want to emphasize that
206

207
208

The arguments in this Part owe a great deal to the pathbreaking scholarship of Sandy
Levinson, whose provocative writings were among the first to take seriously the idea that
constitutional law emerges from a process of perpetual contestation in which no single
body ever has definitive control over constitutional meaning. See, e.g., LEVINSON, supra
note 2, at 29.
See, e.g., Post, supra note 2, at 8 (providing different definitions for constitutional law and
culture).
See supra note 157 and accompanying text.
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my analytical perspective also raises concerns about the substance of
their account.
According to such scholars, what happens within the courts is, by
definition, not "culture." It may be influenced by culture or reflect
culture, but it is not itself culture. It is something else that goes by
the authoritative name of "law."
While there is nothing objectively wrong with such a conclusionas it is true by the definitional terms set by these authors-it paints a
First, it contributes to and reinforces the
misleading picture.
fetishization of the judicial opinion, both by failing to acknowledge
that the opinion itself is a cultural document and by failing to appreciate that it is produced by a series of internal court norms and practices that behave like cultural forms. Second, by treating what goes
on at the courts as a matter of law-making rather than culture, it reinforces the notion that the arrangement, practices, norms, and habits
of thought that influence judges most directly are permanent or
semi-permanent structures rather than evolving and contingent ones.
Third, perhaps unintentionally, it reinforces a vision of the constitutional courts as a citadel that is under constant pressure from outside
forces, rather than as part of the broader society.
Here my concerns follow those of some legal and cultural historians who object to the construction of those who purport to study "law
and society" preferring instead a construction, such as "law in society," in order to emphacize that that law is a part of society, not just
something that is influenced by society.2 0 Similarly, my analysis
pushes me to prefer a description of constitutional decisionmaking
that-in both terminology and substance-acknowledges that what
goes on in and comes out of the courts is not just influenced by our
culture but is itself culture.
C. Underscoringthe Importance of "Off the Books" ConstitutionalDecisions

The constitutional culture perspective also emphasizes the importance of the work of scholars who recognize that many of the important decisions we make regarding whether and how to enforce
constitutional norms have very little to do with the words of the Constitution or even with the kinds of non-textual considerations that
tend to be expressly considered in judicial opinions. On the margins,
209

See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Willard Hurst, Master of the Legal Process, 1997 Wisc. L.
REv. 1181, 1183, 1186-87 (noting that Willard Hurst called his famous early legal history
materials "Law in Society" and discussing what that distinction meant for Hurst, and now
means for his intellectual descendants).
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this is a non-controversial position. Scholars such as Lawrence Sager
and Sandy Levinson have long reminded us that constitutional values
often produce constitutional consequences through mechanisms
other than judicial decisions,1 o while Akhil Amar, David Strauss, and
others have demonstrated how constitutional decisionmaking frequently operates via norms and practices that have little to do with
211
textual interpretation.
More recently, a wide variety of scholars with very different substantive interests and ideological orientations have dug deeper, illustrating the degree to which both judicial and non-judicial consideration of constitutional meaning turns on considerations and
formulations that are deeply embedded in our constitutional culture,
despite their lack of specific mention in the constitutional text, and
in many cases despite their invisibility in constitutional cases. Here I
think of works as diverse as Ted White's intellectual and cultural histories of doctrinal forms;"' Ernie Young's discussion of the "extracanonical" Constitution; Tommy Crocker's extended interrogation of
how and why "necessity" worked its way into our constitutional conversation;2" and the bulk of Caleb Nelson's work unpacking historical
expectations about the ways in which judges ought to interpret words,
construe statutes, and exercise their duties.
210

See, e.g., LEVINSON, supra note 2, at 191 (describing the Constitution as a linguistic system
that "has helped to generate a uniquely American form of political rhetoric that allows
one to grapple with every important political issue imaginable"); Lawrence Gene Sager,
Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced ConstitutionalNorms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212,
1227 (1978) (arguing that government officials attempt to avoid unconstitutional conduct according to their own conceptions of constitutional norms at the margins where
the courts cannot enforce such norms due to lack of institutional competence and pro-

priety).
211

See, e.g., Amar, supra note 10, at 56 ("In [several important issues], the Constitution, honestly read, provides an attractive regime that the Court ignored for decades or more, and
that today's Court sometimes still fails to honor."); David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation,63 U. CHIC. L. REv. 877, 929 (1996) (asserting that the most important
principles emerging from recent constitutional common law lack strong roots to the text
of the Constitution).

212

See, e.g., G. Edward White, HistoricizingJudicialScrutiny, 57 S.C. L. REv. 1 (2005) (describing emergence of modern tiers of scrutiny and contrasting this approach with earlier par-

adigms).
213
214
215

Young, supranote 10, at 415.
THOMAS P. CROCKER, OVERCOMING NECESSITY:
EMERGENCY, CONSTRAINT, AND THE
MEANING OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM (forthcoming 2016).
Nelson, supra note 192, at 522 ("The [Constitution's] early interpreters-including not
just the courts, but also legislatures, executive officials, the state ratifying conventions,
and members of the public at large-helped both to narrow the range of accepted interpretive approaches and to settle discrete questions about particular provisions."); Caleb
Nelson, The Persistence of General Law, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 503, 568 (2006) ("[C]ourts articulating rules of federal common law do not assert such freewheeling discretion as is of-
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The constitutional culture perspective highlights the similarities
between these works and puts them in a broader theoretical frame.
Each of these works explores interpretive norms, habits of thought,
or other intellectual structures that shape the ways in which we conceptualize and implement our fundamental law. These structures are
features of our constitutional system with histories, trajectories, and
connections to other salient cultural fields. They assert motive power, shaping both the content of opinions and the specific constraints
and opportunities imposed on or guaranteed to the people in the
name of the Constitution.
D. A "Living"ConstitutionalCultureRather than a "LivingConstitution"
The constitutional culture perspective also helps to explain one of
the great puzzles of constitutional interpretation, what Ernie Young
Put simply, given
calls "the great puzzle" of constitutional change.2
why is the
document,
a
static
the fact that the Constitution is itself
content of constitutional law always changing and why does the prospect of such change sit so well with the vast majority of constitutional
observers?"' The prevailing metaphor posits a "living Constitution"
that evolves in response to the desires, needs, hopes, and fears of a
The problem, of course, is that the object
changing population.1
that is allegedly "living" or "evolving" is a written document with a
specific history and a largely stable text, not an organism or even a

216
217
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ten supposed; general law significantly constrains, and often entirely defines, the substance of the rules of decision that they apply."); Caleb Nelson, State and Federal Modelv of
the Interaction Between Statutes and Unwritten Law, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 657, 662 (2013)
("[C]ourts sometimes go on to conclude that Congress enacted the statute against the
backdrop supplied by widely accepted principles of unwritten law and that the statute
should be understood as implicitly adopting those principles.")
Young, supranote 10, at 455.
Professor Young's answer to this question focuses on the fact that much of the change in
our institutions of government and in our understanding of the basic norms of government and individual rights have come through or been reinforced by statutory and regulatory developments that he argues are part of the "noncanonical" constitution. See id. at
454-57 (proposing a functional approach that recognizes the role of political institutions
for which the Framers "left room" to explain change in American constitutionalism).
While that observation is no doubt true and extremely helpful in understanding how
both constitutional law and constitutional culture have evolved, it is incomplete, as it provides no mechanism for explaining (and thus implicitly condemns) constitutional developments that have been instantiated through shifts in our understanding of the "canonical" Constitution.
For a full and rich exploration of the metaphor and its discontents, see Scott Dodson, A
Darwinist View of the Living Constitution, 61 VAND. L. REV. 1319, 1324 (2008) ("The living
Constitution was born, it was nurtured as it developed into maturity, and it continues to
grow with society." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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complex social system that might profitably be analogized to a living
organism. The failure of the governing metaphor to fit with its purported object not only provokes discomfort but also provides ammunition to those who challenge the validity of methodologies that embrace an evolutionary Constitution.
Put more bluntly, the
metaphor's lack of descriptive plausibility undercuts its normative
appeal.
These problems are largely avoided-and greater descriptive accuracy is likely achieved-if we recognize that we do not have a "living Constitution," but instead a "living constitutional culture." Our
constitutional culture is not a static document, but a complex system
that has a history, passes through a life cycle, is constantly evolving,
and responds directly to various kinds of stimuli. When talking about
a "living constitutional culture" we are still in the realm of metaphor,
but it is a more plausible and comfortable metaphor.
Shifting our focus from a living Constitution to a living constitutional culture also allows us to understand why evolving constitutional
law is not a choice but an inevitability. To reiterate the point that began this Article, constitutional law does not emerge fully formed from
the constitutional text but is made through a process that filters the
text through concrete institutions, practices, and habits of thought.
We know from experiences that those elements are constantly evolving, but, even if we did not have that empirical data, we could assume
as much. To the extent that people have freedom to formulate institutions and define norms, different groups of people will make different choices. On the flip side, to the extent that the process of
adopting practices, norms, and intellectual structures is less than fully
conscious, these cultural elements are similarly time- and placedependent, as the influences that shape them are not stable but everevolving.
One needs to be careful, however. To argue that constitutional
law is, by necessity, always evolving is not to argue that judges necessarily should adopt consciously evolutionary interpretive methods.
One might, for example, believe that a certain amount of doctrinal
adaptation to current cultural norms is inevitable, but that it behooves us to minimize this effect 9 or that judges are not the proper
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See, e.g., Brian Z. Tamanaha, The DistortingSlant in QuantitativeStudies ofJudging, 50 B.C. L.
REv. 685, 702-05 (2009) (analyzing with nuance some of the reasons judges might strive
to faithfully apply the law in an objective or static way, notwithstanding their position as
subjective modern individuals with particular policy preferences).
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actors to effectuate this adaptation.220 Judges who believe either of
those things might consciously choose to adopt a methodology, such
as one of the various forms of originalism, that constrains their ability
to consciously account for the values and preferences of the current
generation, and may even make a plausible argument that other
judges should be required to adopt such a methodology.
E. ConstitutionalLaw as Democratic Governance

As discussed several times above, an approach to constitutional
theory that requires us to survey the various institutions, practices,
norms, and habits of thought through which constitutional law is
made keeps butting up against places in our constitutional culture
where individuals and interests have opportunities to shape constitutional outcomes. Our current constitutional culture has, for example, developed norms that increasingly evaluate potential judges
based on predictions about the substance of their constitutional jurisprudence.2

We have developed institutions and technologies that

make it easier for interest groups and ideological allies to nurture politically motivated challenges to legislation. 23 We have encouraged
broad amicus participation at the Supreme Court level, in part in order to give the Court information about the preferences and interests
224
of various constituencies. And we have delegated much of the work
of informing the public about the content and consequences of Supreme Court rulings to interests groups, political organizations, bloggers, and an increasingly ideologically polarized media.2
As I discussed in Part IV above, one can reach different conclusions about the normative implications of these cultural evolutions.226
220

221
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For one among many articles dealing with these issues of institutional competence, see
William A. Fletcher, The Discretionay Constitution: Institutional Remedies andjudicial Legitimacy, 91 YALE L.J. 635, 666-67 (1982) (examining Justice Frankfurter's jurisprudential
recognition of judicial institutional incompentence, which "derived from the political
question doctrine, sounding in questions of separation of powers and the superior competence of the political branches to make certain determinations").
See Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 863-64 (1989)
("The inevitable tendency of judges to think that the law is what they would like it to be
will, I have no doubt, cause most errors in judicial historiography to be made in the direction of projecting upon the age of 1789 current, modern values-so that as applied, even
as applied in the best of faith, originalism will (as the historical record shows) end up as
something of a compromise.").
See supraPart I.D.
See supraPart II.D.
See supraPart II.B.
See supraPart II.C.
See supratext accompanying note 191.
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Nevertheless, they are hard to ignore. Whether one's project is normative, evaluative, or merely descriptive, its accuracy and utility depends on taking seriously the many ways in which our current constitutional culture creates participatory norms that turn constitutional
decisionmaking into a form of democratic governance.

CONCLUSION

As the first two Parts of this Article have hopefully demonstrated,
constitutional theorists and other constitutional commentators make
heavy use of a paradigm that mistakes certain aspects of our current
constitutional decision-making process for inherent parts of our constitutional structure and ignores other important aspects of that process entirely. These distortions and elisions raise concerns about the
accuracy of much descriptive constitutional commentary and the
foundations of more normative and evaluative work. Drawing in part
on an emerging literature, this Article proposes a new paradigm for
thinking about the process through which we make constitutional
law, one that understands that almost all of our institutional arrangements, practices, norms, and habits of thought are nominal,
historically-contingent, and ever-evolving, and that aims to treat them
as a complicated, interlocking constitutional culture.
The final two Parts of the Article are, intentionally, something of a
tease, offering glimpses of the descriptive clarity and analytic insight
that might be gleaned from sustained scholarly endeavors along the
path that I chart. I have no illusion that all those who explore our
rich constitutional culture from this perspective will agree with either
my description of its features or the lessons that I have drawn. Indeed, even when it comes to my own work, those characterizations
and observations are contingent and subject to substantial modification as I pursue the intellectual agenda sketched out in this Article.
That, again, is by design. This Article is motivated by a simple critique, but that critique, like many critiques, leads not to a simple solution but instead to a substantial intellectual undertaking.

